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ABSTRACT
Previous assessments o f the value o f antidumping (AD) petitions have utilized 
event studies. These estimate the significance of abnormal returns to security holders 
of the pertinent firms at important decision dates in the AD investigation. However, 
security holders have varying degrees of information about the prospects for their 
firm. The present study estimates the significance o f earnings forecast revisions and 
the accuracy of those forecasts around these dates by brokerage firm analysts. 
Analysts maintain a professional relationship with the firms that they follow. As such, 
they are assumed to be better informed than the average security holders. Their 
earnings forecast revisions, accuracy, and bias should provide a superior estimate of 
the value o f the petitions to the pertinent firms. We provide evidence that analysts 
expect declining performance from pertinent firms in first year earning when the ITC- 
Preliminary decision turns out to be negative; but possible improvement in second 
year earning upon learning the Department o f Commerce final decision. We provide 
no evidence that the filing o f an AD petition or the announcement o f the verdicts of 
the investigation affects analysts’ expectation about firm five year (long-term) 
earnings growth. Therefore, our finding shows that the AD petition investigations 
affect analyst’s expectations about firm performance on a short-term basis. We also 
find that analysts may anticipate their second year earnings forecast three months and 
one month before the filing date. When we examine analysts’ forecast errors in the 
year following the filing o f AD petitions, we find no evidence that the filing of an AD 
petition affects analysts’ forecast accuracy or bias.
xi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Dumping Petition and Analysts’ Forecast
Analysts (sell brokerage firms) serve an important function for both firm 
management and investors. Although this may now be limited by Fair Disclosure, 
analysts historically have served as a vehicle by which managers transmit information 
to the market. Despite having the option of directly issuing guidance to the market, 
managers may prefer to convey their views through an intermediary. This has the 
advantage of limiting their liability for guidance that may turn out to be mistaken. 
For example, management may believe that filing an antidumping (AD) petition may 
result in increased earnings for their firm in the future. However, they may want to 
be careful about stating this directly through the guidance they provide in their 
quarterly reports. The petition may be denied. Even if  successful, it may not 
materially affect earnings. Furthermore, an affirmative AD petition requires a 
positive material injury assessment. To succeed in the petition without an adverse 
effect on their stock price, managers may be in the position o f saying one thing to the 
investigative authority, and another to its investors. Hence, they may prefer that 
analysts speak to the market. An AD petition may be construed as less material than 
a merger or acquisition. However, it may also be considered as more specific than 
discussions about the economy. Hence, management may prefer that analysts filter 
the conveyance regarding AD petitions to the market. Because o f recent scrutiny of 
the financial services industry, the study of analysts is inherently interesting. Prior to
1
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the Regulation of Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), analysts could move markets, making it 
difficult to assess the value of a decision through abnormal returns if stock prices are 
already reflective o f the value of petition.
Analysts are likely to be deemed as more independent than management by 
investors. They are also likely to be considered as better informed than investors 
because they have better access to management, and because their profession is to 
follow the companies in the sector in which they are specialized. Hence, how 
analysts evaluate and respond to the invocation and implementation of a public policy 
is an interesting issue. To our knowledge, this has never been investigated. We will 
do so in the context of AD petition.
1.2. Importance of the Study
The use of financial data to analyze trade policy is well established in the 
international trade literature. However, this has been primarily in the use of event 
studies to assess the value o f administered protection decisions (dumping, subsidies, 
and the Escape Clause). Examples include Hartigan, Kamma, and Perry (1986, 1989, 
1994); Hughes, Lenway, and Rayburn (1997); Krupp and Pollard (1996); Rehbein 
and Starks (1995), and Lenway, Rehbein, and Starks (1990). Other examples o f the 
use o f event studies in the analysis o f trade policy are Brander’s (1991) and 
Thompson’s (1993, 1994) studies of the U.S./Canada free trade agreement. A 
different use o f financial data in the context of the trade policy is Hartigan and 
Rogers’ (2002) demonstration that the filing o f AD petitions and insider buying in the 
two months preceding the complaint are significantly related.
2
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In the present paper, we continue the invocation of firm level financial data to 
analyze trade policy. In particular, we specify a time series and cross section (TSCS) 
panel o f average earning forecasts for the firms with publicly traded common stock 
that are actively followed by analysts and are investigated by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission in AD complaints. So as to assess the anticipated value of AD 
relief to the investigated firms, we provide evidence o f the statistical significance of 
the critical decisions in the AD investigations to earnings forecast revisions by 
analysts. This provides an important supplement to and clarification of the 
aforementioned event studies. The market response at a decision date in an 
investigation is likely to reflect a mixture of short and long run influences. For 
example, an affirmative material injury verdict may be interpreted as bad news 
regarding near term earnings, as the confidential investigation by the USITC may be 
construed as disclosing previously unknown negative information about a firm. 
However, it may be viewed as good news for longer term earnings if it raises the 
probability that protection will be awarded. We will test for this by considering 
earnings revisions over the horizons of one year ahead earnings forecast, two years 
ahead earnings forecast, and of five years long term earnings growth.
The response of analysts’ earnings forecasts to announcements of 
consequence to firms has been investigated previously. Examples are the Chaney, 
Hogan, and Jeter (1999) study of the reporting of restructuring charges, and the Lys 
and Sohn (1991) inquiry into corporate accounting disclosures. To our knowledge, 
however, this is the first examination of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions in the 
context of the implementation o f a public policy.
3
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1.3. Objective of the Study
Previous assessments o f the value of antidumping (AD) petitions have utilized 
event studies, which estimate the significance o f abnormal returns to security holders 
o f the pertinent firms at important decision dates in the AD investigation. However, 
security holders have varying degrees of information about the prospects for their 
firm. The present study examines the effect o f filing AD petitions and the verdicts of 
the investigative decision on analysts’ earnings revisions and forecasts. The study 
also assesses the more immediate effect of filing AD petitions and the verdicts of the 
investigation, as well as the longer term implications. We estimate the significance of 
earnings forecast revisions and the accuracy of those forecasts around these dates by 
brokerage firm analysts. Analysts maintain a professional relationship with the firms 
they follow. As such, they are assumed to be better informed than the average 
security holder. Their earnings forecast revisions, accuracy, and bias should provide a 
superior estimate of the value of the petitions to the pertinent firms. On the other 
hand, how analysts are compensated may affect their willingness to be candid. That 
is, they may be biased upwards in their forecasts if  their compensation is tied to 
underwriting of securities by the brokerage for which they work.
1.4. Approach of the Study
Our approach in this study is the following:
4
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First, to examine how brokerage firm analysts adjust their earnings forecasts 
when AD petitions are filed and when critical decisions are made in the investigation 
process.
Second, to compare the mean of analysts’ forecasts before filing AD petitions 
and the verdicts o f the investigation to the mean of analysts’ forecasts subsequent to 
the filing AD petitions, controlling for the verdicts o f the investigation.
Third, to address the analysts’ accuracy and bias following the filing of AD 
petitions and to consider whether analysts become more or less accurate in their 
forecasts after learning of the filing of AD petitions.
1.5. Bottom Line of the Study
The bottom line o f our study is to answer the following questions:
First, are the filing of AD petitions and the verdicts of the investigation viewed 
by brokerage firm analysts as a signal of better or worse times ahead? Are they 
viewed the same by analysts versus the markets?
Second, do analysts become more or less accurate in their forecasts after learning 
of the filing of AD petitions?
1.6. Results of the Study
We found evidence that the AD petition investigations affect analysts’ 
expectations about firm performance on a short term basis. Subsequent to the
5
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negative ITC Preliminary decision, analysts tend to revise their one year ahead 
earnings forecast downward, on average. Furthermore, analysts tend to revise their 
second year earnings upward subsequent to the final decision o f the Department of 
Commerce. We also found that analysts may adjust their second year earnings 
forecast revision earlier than the filing date. These adjustments occurred three months 
and one month before the filing date. At the three months before firm filing an AD 
petition, analysts were still optimistic about their second year ahead earnings forecast. 
This may be because the information regarding whether or not the firm making a 
petition is still noisy at this time. At one month before filing, analysts change their 
expectation on their second year ahead earnings forecast by revising it downward, on 
average. This is may be because more information becomes available to analysts and 
to the market. Moreover, subsequent to the Department of Commerce’s final decision, 
analysts become more optimistic on their second year ahead earnings forecast. Since 
95 percent o f DoC decisions are in the affirmative, what is uncertain at the time of the 
decision is the AD duties that the DoC will announce. This revision may indicate that 
analysts believe that the level of duties will benefit the firm. We found no evidence 
that the AD petition investigation affects analysts’ expectation on a firms’ long term 
performance. When we examine analysts’ forecast errors in the year following the 
filing of AD petitions, we find no evidence that filing an AD petition affects analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and bias.
1.7. Organization of the Study
6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter II presents the literature review and the motivation o f the study. Chapter 
III presents the empirical research design. The estimation econometrics techniques 
pertaining to this study are presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V discusses the sources 
of the data used in this study. Chapter VI lays out the results of the regressions. 
Finally, the conclusion is presented in Chapter VII.
7
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION
II.l. Introduction
The research about dumping covers both theoretical and empirical studies. This 
chapter provides an overview of the theoretical studies o f dumping. It also presents 
the landmark empirical dumping studies, with the emphasis on event studies. Section
II.2 presents the empirical literature, which focuses primarily on event studies. 
Section II.3 describes the motivation of the study.
II.2. Empirical Literature1
The application of the financial data into the codetermination o f security prices 
and the analysis o f economic events (which is called the market model) has been very 
common in the past decades, and the empirical literature in international trade is no 
exception in using it. The market model provides a foundation for using security price 
data to gauge the effect of the stages o f litigation, and/or public regulation on the
1 This thesis approaches the problem from an empirical perspective. The traditional 
theory about dumping was initiated by Viner (1923). However, a wave of interest on 
this phenomenon had not been developed overwhelmingly until Ethier (1982) and 
Brander and Krugman (1983), who initiated the modem theory of dumping. A
seminal development in this interest was Gruenspecht (1988), who shows that an AD
law may affect a market equilibrium, even when there were no AD duties imposed.
Several additional authors have investigated the AD law’s effect in a variety of
contexts. These include Pinto (1986), Hartigan (1994, 1995, 1996, 2000), Staiger and
Wolak (1992), Prusa (1992, 1994, 1998, 2001), Clarida (1993), Hansen and Prusa
(1997), Kolev and Prusa (2002), Cheng, Qiu and Wong (2001). A general consensus 
appears to be that AD laws affect both domestic and foreign firms’ strategic behavior, 
and the impact on these firms is ambiguous. There are contexts in which a home 
country AD law can benefit both domestic and foreign firms or benefit either one.
8
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investors’ expectations of the affected firms’ profitability. This foundation is 
particularly useful for testing the hypothesis that producers receive net benefits 
(“producer protection” at the expense of consumers) or net loss (“consumer 
protection” at the expense o f regulated firms) from the litigation and/or government 
regulation. Or, whether the regulator itself receives net benefits at the expense o f both 
producers and consumers. Based on these hypotheses, the market model explains the 
effect o f the litigation and/or government regulation on the behavior o f the regulated 
firms’ security values.
Pioneered by Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and Roll (1969), the general practice of the 
codetermination of firms’ security values and the analysis of economic events is what 
we call the method of “residual analysis” or “abnormal return.” The empirical 
procedure of this method is conditioned on the absence or existence of the event 
under study. Under the absence of the event, we invoke the market model of stock 
return and get the coefficient estimation. Then, under the existence of the event, we 
determine whether there is a discrepancy between the actual and predicted value of 
the stock return. This discrepancy is known as the residual or abnormal return. 
Finally, we ascertain the relationship between residual returns and events through a 
significant test.
The underlying assumption of the residual method is that stock markets operate 
in an efficient manner and investors are rational. As Schwert (1981) pointed out:
The efficient-markets/rational-expectations hypothesis posits that 
security prices reflect all available information. Hence, unanticipated 
changes in regulation result in a current change in security prices, and
9
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the price change is an unbiased estimate of the value of the change in 
future cash flows to the firm, (p.l)
The weak form is that security prices reflect all public information. The strong form 
is that they reflect all information.
The use o f financial data to analyze trade policy is well established in the 
international trade literature. However, this has been primarily in the use of event 
studies to assess the value of administered protection decisions (dumping, subsidies, 
and the escape clause). Hartigan, Kamma, Perry (1986: hereafter HKP) use the capital 
market event study to analyze whether a firm looking for protection earns an normal 
return.” The abnormal return is defined as the return that is significantly different 
from the predicted return given the firm’s normal relationship with the capital market. 
HKP focus their analysis on the escape clause petition filed under the Trade Act of 
1974 (Section 201). They examine whether the appeal for protection and subsequent 
USITC (United States International Trade Commission) and Presidential Decision 
affect the value of the firm’s common stock. HKP provide both time series and cross 
section analysis of how advantageous protection is in benefiting those firms that look 
for it. HKP conclude that “Protection is beneficial to beleaguered industries. 
However, the extent of that benefit may be quite narrowly circumscribed and 
conditional on internal variables for each firm” (p. 616).
Continuing the application of the capital market event study method, HKP (1989) 
investigate the importance of the distinction between threat o f injury and actual injury 
that the USITC uses as a decision criterion in dumping investigation. HKP’s paper 
focuses on non-steel antidumping petitions filed under the Trade Reform Act o f 1979
10
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(Section 731). HKP provide a time series analysis whether a firm looking for a 
protection earns abnormal return on the dates for which protection decisions are made 
for each case. HKP find that relief is valuable to the firms seeking protection only if 
the firms are in the phase of being threatened with injury from dumping, that is, the 
firms have not been injured yet.
In another paper, HKP (1990) utilize the capital market event study approach to 
explore the importance o f the USITC decision making procedure by focusing on the 
USITC material injury decision. HKP use a cross section regression to explain the 
abnormal returns generated on decision dates in the investigation o f unfair practices. 
HKP provide a profile that healthy firms, in term of profitability, are likely to get 
advantages from protection. That is, the firms are not yet suffering material injury 
although they are very susceptible to a surge of less than fair value (LTFV) imports. 
HKP reveal their finding with the reason that the USITC decision tends to deny 
protection toward firms that are in a pre-injury state.
With the belief that the injury standards and remedies should differ for dumping 
and subsidization, HKP (1994) show another application o f the capital market event 
study method in investigating subsidy and dumping decisions for the U.S. steel 
industry. For both dumping and subsidy cases, HKP provide evidence of different 
market reactions. This suggests that the government should judge dumping and 
subsidization in a different way. The implication o f HKP’s study is that the injury 
standard should be weaker, but the remedy should be stronger under subsidization in 
comparison with dumping, since the former are more injurious to their home 
producers.
11
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Other applications of the capital market event study method in assessing the 
value of administered protection decisions are shown in Begley, Hughes, Rayburn, 
and Runkle (1998); Hughes, Lenway, and Rayburn (1997); Krupp and Pollard (1996); 
Rehbein and Starks (1995); and Lenway, Rehbein, and Starks (1990).
Begley, Hughes, Rayburn, and Runkle (1998: hereafter BHRR) investigate the 
stock price effects o f the series of events leading to the 1986 Memorandum Of 
Understanding (MOU) under which Canada agreed to impose a 15 percent export 
tariff on lumber shipped to the United States. Similar to previous event study 
literature, BHRR focus their research on stock price behavior on the event dates when 
the news related to MOU transpired. Overall, BHRR’s results show significant stock 
market reactions toward the settlement of the dispute leading to the MOU.
Hughes, Lenway, and Rayburn (1997: hereafter HLR) use the capital market 
event study method to analyze the stock price behavior o f both the semiconductor 
producers and their downstream consumers upon the impact o f the 1986 United 
States/Japan Semiconductor Trade Accord. Under this agreement, the US government 
imposed price floors for Japanese firms to sell in the U.S. while the Japanese 
government agreed to provide U.S. firms with a 20 percent target market share to sell 
in Japan. HLR focus their analysis on the strategic trade model in comparison to the 
neoclassical trade model. The former support the argument that trade protection will 
enhance global competitiveness of related domestic industries as long as 
technological spillover exists among producers, suppliers, and consumers. Likewise, 
the latter suggests that trade protection benefits domestic producers at the expense of 
the consumers. The goal o f HLR’s research is to test whether stock market reaction
12
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on both the semiconductor firms and their downstream consumers support the 
strategic trade policy argument. The overall HLR’s results support this argument.
Krupp and Pollard (1996: hereafter, KP) investigate empirically the response of 
imports to the various stages of antidumping investigations using monthly product 
specific data from the U.S. chemicals and allied product industry. KP’s paper reveals 
a wide range of behavioral responses that do not necessarily appear to be dependent 
upon the final outcome of the investigation, and in some cases contradicts the 
‘accepted wisdom’ of the impacts these cases have upon import behavior. Rehbein 
and Starks (1995: hereafter, RS) provide further empirical evidence on the impact of 
trade restrictions on foreign competitors. RS’ results contradict the previous 
theoretical and empirical findings that foreign firms benefit from U.S. protection. In 
fact, RS’s results show that Japanese firms did not experience wealth gains upon the 
imposition of U.S. restrictions. Other empirical literature about the event studies 
includes Krupp (1994) and Thompson (1994). A different use of financial data in the 
context of trade policy is Hartigan and Rogers’s (2003) demonstration that the filing 
of AD petitions and insider buying in the two months preceding the complaint are 
significantly related. Other empirical findings about dumping and macroeconomic 
studies are Mah (2000), Blonigen and Haynes (2002).
II.3. Motivation
In general, prior studies on the assessment of the value of antidumping (AD) 
petitions have utilized event studies, which focus on the market’s response and 
estimate the significance of abnormal returns to security holders o f the pertinent firms
13
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at important decision dates in the AD investigation. However, security holders have 
varying degrees of information about the prospect for their firm. Analysts maintain a 
professional relationship with the firms that they follow. As such, they are assumed to 
be better informed then the average security holders.
Following Chaney, Hogan, and Jeter (1999) and Lys and Sohn (1990 ), this
dissertation examines the reaction of analysts to the announcement o f the filing of AD 
petitions and the verdicts of the investigation. Investigating the analysts’ response 
offers several potential advantages over examining market response.
First, by using analysts’ forecasts, we have a clear measure of earning 
expectations before and after the announcement of the filing of AD petitions and the 
announcement of the verdicts of the investigative decision.
Second, because analysts’ forecast earnings are for finite future intervals, we are 
able to examine separately their revisions in forecasts for various horizons. In 
contrast, whether the market reaction is predominantly short-term, long-term, or 
mixed is essentially indistinguishable.
Third, our focus on analysts’ forecasts also enable us to address the analysts’ 
accuracy and bias following the announcement of the filing AD petitions, whether 
analysts become more or less accurate in their forecast after learning of the filing of 
AD petitions.
Fourth, if  analysts move markets through revision announcements, and they anticipate 
a filing, event study results will be biased downwards, as the value o f the petition will 
already be reflected in security prices.
14




This chapter describes the set up of empirical design. Section III.2 introduces 
the typical course o f an antidumping investigation. Section III.3 describes the 
sequence of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. Section III.4 presents the consensus 
estimates of the I/B/E/S (Institute of Brokerage Estimate System). We define 
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and errors in Section III.5 and Section III.7, 
respectively. Section III.6  lays out the regression model o f analysts’ earnings forecast 
revisions in relation to the filing antidumping petitions and the verdicts o f the 
investigation. The regression model of analysts’ forecast errors are presented in 
Section III.8 .
111.2. The Typical Course of an Antidumping Petition Investigation
AD petitions in the U.S. entail a bifurcated investigation process. After a petition 
is filed, the Department o f Commerce (DoC) must make a sufficiency decision within 
20 days. That is, it must determine if the evidence submitted with the petition 
provides an adequate basis for proceeding with the investigation. If sufficiency is 
satisfied, the USITC must determine if material injury is manifest within 45 days of 
the petition. If  that decision is in the affirmative, the DoC must estimate preliminary 
AD margins within 160 days o f the filing date for the accused foreign firms. 
Irrespective o f the preliminary decision, final AD margins must be made by 235 days
15
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after the filing. If this decision is in the affirmative, a final injury determination must 
be made 280 days after the filing. At any point in the investigation, the negotiation of 
a voluntary export restraint (VER) may result in termination of the investigation. The 
verdicts in any of these decisions may result in earnings revisions by analysts. Figure 
1 displays the typical course o f an antidumping investigation.
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Figure III.l Typical course of an AD investigation
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III.3. The Sequence of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Revisions
An Analyst may make a forecast about the earnings o f a firm that he or she covers 
every month. He or she may release his/her forecast for various horizons. It 
incorporates the earnings forecast o f the current quarter, next second quarter, next 
third quarter, and next fourth quarter. Besides the quarterly earnings forecasts, 
analysts also may release the forecasts for the current fiscal year, next second fiscal 
year, next third fiscal year, next fourth fiscal year, and the next fifth fiscal year. In 
addition, analysts also may release the forecasts for the five year (or long term) 
earnings growth. In practice, analysts’ forecasts may and/or may not contain all of 
these horizons. Their forecasts typically do not contain periods beyond the third fiscal 
year and fourth quarter.
Analysts forecast earnings for a finite future period or interval. The sequence of 
analysts’ earnings forecast horizon is represented in Figure III.2. The twelve-month 
period is a firm’s fiscal period and it is not necessarily related to a calendar year. For 
example, suppose that a firm X has a January to December fiscal year and suppose 
also that it currently is the month of January 2002. In January 2002, Analyst A 
releases his forecast about X’s earnings, which incorporate X ’s earnings for the 
quarterly period ending March 2002, June 2002, September 2002, and December 
2002. Analyst A also releases X’s earnings for the yearly period ending December 
2002 (current fiscal year, horizon=l), December 2003 (next second fiscal year, 
horizon=2), December 2004 (next third fiscal year, horizon=3), December 2004 (next 
fourth fiscal year, horizon=4), and December 2005 (next fifth fiscal year, horizon=5). 
Analyst A also releases his forecast about X’s earnings growth during the next five
18
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years (five-year long term earnings growth forecast). Moreover, in February 2002, 
Analyst A may and/or may not revise the forecast about firm X ’s earnings that he 
made last month dependent on the information released between January and 
February. The forecast process continues to the next succeeding months. Moreover, 
each firm does not necessarily have the same fiscal period. Another firm may have a 
March to February fiscal year period or a July to June fiscal year period. However, 
the sequence of forecast horizon is as similar as to what we have just explained.
III.4. The I/B/E/S (Institute of Brokerage Estimate System) Consensus Estimates
The data o f analysts’ forecast that we use in this study is the I/B/E/S (Institute of 
Brokerage Estimate System) 1999 US summary estimate, which provides the 
consensus forecasts or estimates. The consensus forecasts were obtained by averaging 
the estimates of the individuals taking part in the forecasts. The following is the 
explanation o f the I/B/E/S consensus estimate.
In practice, many analysts follow and release forecasts for a given company 
(analysts following), and I/B/E/S releases the consensus estimates, which is the mean 
of all analysts forecasts, on Thursday before the third Friday of each month. As the 
glossary of I/B/E/S convention mentions (the third paragraph from the bottom of page 
7): “In historical products, ‘One Month Ago’ refers the last monthly I/B/E/S cycle. 
The I/B/E/S monthly cycle always occurs on the Thursday before the third Friday 
each month and as a result, ‘One Month Ago’ data can either be as o f four weeks ago 
or five weeks ago, dependent on the month.” Figure III.3 depicts the I/B/E/S 
consensus estimate and the time released.
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Ist quarter 2nd quarter 3 rd quarter
earnings earnings earnings
announcement announcement announcement 
period period period
<-   ^
|_ 1 |_2 |_3 |_4 l_5 |_ 6  |_7 |_ 8  \_9 |_ 10 J_ 1 1 J _ 1 2 J  1st fiscal year
<r 1st quarter -><- 2nd quarter-^ <r 3 rd quarter -> 4th quarter ->
--------------- First Year Earnings, Horizon (h )= l------------------>
4th quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 
earnings earnings earnings earnings
announcement announcement announcement announcement 
period period period period
 -»<- -»«- ->«■ ->
L 1 |_2 |_3 |_4 |_5 |_ 6  |_7 |_ 8  |_9 |_10_|_11 J _ 1 2J  2nd fiscal year
1st quarter -><- 2nd q u a r t e r - ^ 3 rd quarter -><- 4th quarter ->
-------------- Second Year Earnings, Horizon (h)=2---------------
4 th quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3 rd quarter
earnings earnings earnings earnings
announcement announcement announcement announcement 
period period period period
   ----------------
|_1 |_2 |_3 |_4 |_5 |_ 6  |_7 |_8 j_9 |_1 0_|_11_|_12J 5th fiscal year
<- 1st quarter -><- 2nd quarter-><- 3 rd quarter 4th quarter ->
-------------------------- Fifth Year Earnings--------------------------
Figure III.2. The sequence of analysts’ earnings forecast horizons
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Month t-1 Month t Month t+1
xh/-j xVi X h/ X h l X h2 X h3 xh* m X 1 X 2 X  3 X *
I/B/E/S 
releases its consensus 
earnings forecast 
on Thursday before 
the third Friday 
o f month t-1
I/B/E/S 
releases its consensus 
earnings forecast 
on Thursday before 
the third Friday 
o f month t
I/B/E/S 
releases its consensus 
earnings forecast 
on Thursday before 
the Third Friday 
of month t+1
h  _  k = \
=
i
AFt = k = 1
m
A f h  = . M .
A F h is the mean (consensus) forecast of various horizons.
x- is the analyst’s forecast o f h horizon ahead earnings.
l,m,n are the number of analysts (estimates) for a particular month I/B/E/S 
consensus. I/B/E/S reports that the number of analysts that follow a particular firm is 
not necessarily the same for each month.
Figure III.3. I/B/E/S consensus estimates
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III.5. Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Revision
We examine the revisions o f analysts’ earning per share forecasts for various 
horizons surrounding the filing dates and the announcement dates o f the verdicts of 
the antidumping investigation. We investigate which decision is most important from 
the perspective o f financial analysts. Analysts’ earning forecast revisions are defined 
as:
c\ i \ a nr I' FEPS/,/+i — FEPS 1,1-1(3.1) AFrev,, = ----------   ,
t j - \
where:
AFrev1’ = The analysts’ earning forecast revisions o f h-year ahead earnings (h=l,2) 
or earnings growth (h=5) for firm i in month t,
FEPS,J+\ = The mean forecast o f h-year ahead earnings (h=T,2) or earnings growth 
(h=5) for firm i in month t+1,
FEPSi,i-i = The mean forecast o f h-year ahead earnings (h=l,2) or earnings growth 
(h=5) for firm i in month t-1.
P, = The price (deflation factor) of firm i at the beginning of the period t-1.
According to Lys and Sohn (1990), the price deflation is chosen to facilitate cross- 
sectional comparison o f regression coefficients. We tried to deflate analysts’ revision 
by analysts’ forecast at time t-1, and it turned out to be problematic. Forecasts can be 
small, zero, or negative numbers. Further, it can be contended that the stock price 
change (Pricet -  Pricet.i) is a function o f the analysts’ forecast revision (Forecast, -  
Forecast,.,). As such, dividing both sides by the price at time t-1, we get return as a
22
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function o f the price deflated analysts’ forecast revisions. It became obvious that the 
way we calculate analysts’ forecast revisions is an alternative proxy of stock returns, 
in which the existing literature approaches the event study by estimating the 
significance o f abnormal returns to security holders in the assessment of the value of 
AD petitions.
We define an event that happened in month t as an announcement that takes place 
in the interval between the Thursday before the third Friday of month t-1 and the 
Thursday before the third Friday of month t. In equation (3.1) above, we use the 
analysts’ forecast (I/B/E/S consensus) of month t+1 instead of month t for the post­
event forecast. This is to ensure that the consensus forecast after the event consists of 
all after-event forecasts. Otherwise, there will be a ‘noise’ in our post event consensus 
forecast. For example, suppose that an event takes place in month t (see Figure 3). 
Specifically, the event happened in the interval between xh2 and xV  It is obvious that 
AFht will not contain a ‘pure’ post event analysts’ forecast, since xhi and xh2 are pre-
L
event individual analyst forecasts. For this reason, we use AF t+i as a post-event 
consensus forecast in equation (3.1) above, since AFht+i contains only individual 
analyst post-event forecasts.
III.6. Empirical Regression on Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Revisions 
in Relation to the Filing of Antidumping Petitions and the Verdicts 
of the Investigation.
To investigate the relation between the revisions of financial analysts’ forecast 
and the announcement o f any verdict, we use the Chaney, Hogan, and Jeter (1999)
23
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approach with slight modification and estimate the following regression for our 
sample of firms that filed a petition between 1985 and 1987. We utilized monthly 
data in our panel. To increase the power o f our test, our observation starts from July 
1984 and continues through June 1989 for each firm.
3
AFrev1’ = ' £ } ' t AFrev-\,_j + a lLossll + a 2UEu + a 3Loss*UEll
7=1
0-2) + 2 > A ,+ M ( / ) + A „ ( ( ) + « „
k = 1
where:
AFrev'., =  The revision in the mean forecasts for h-year ahead earnings (h=l,2) 
or earnings growth (h=5) for firm i in month t,
3
]T yj AFrev1-t_j = Lags o f the analysts’ forecast revision for h-year ahead
7=1
earnings (h=l,2) or earnings growth (h=5) for firm i in month t, 
Lossit = A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if in month t (announcement
month only) the quarterly net income of firm i is reported to be less 
than zero, 0  otherwise,
UEU =  Unexpected earnings in month t (announcement month only),
Du, = 1 if firm i petition filing happened in month t, 0 otherwise,
Z)2„ = 1 if USITC Preliminary decision that happened in month t is
NEGATIVE, 0 otherwise,
Z)3„ = 1 if USITC Preliminary decision that happened in month t is
AFFIRMATIVE, 0 otherwise,
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£>4 „ = 1 if DoC Preliminary decision happened in month t, 0 otherwise,
DS il = 1 if  DoC Final decision regarding firm i petition happened in month t, 
0  otherwise,
D6 ii -  1 if USITC Final decision regarding firm i that happened in month t 
is NEGATIVE, 0 otherwise,
Dl lt = 1 if USITC Final decision regarding firm i that happened in month t 
is AFFIRMATIVE, 0 otherwise,
M ( / )  = F irm specific effects,
A (0 ~ Time effects (monthly),
s,, = The error term with the assumption of normally distributed (0, V).
Unlike Chaney et al (1999), we set our panel data on a monthly basis and 
compare the mean of analysts’ forecasts before an event to the mean of analysts’ 
forecasts subsequent to the event. This is because the dates o f filing an AD petition 
and the dates of its investigative decision are independent from the dates o f quarterly 
earnings announcements. We also include the lags o f the analysts’ earnings forecasts 
revision as the explanatory variables, because there may be inertia in analysts’ 
forecast revision. We assume that we have three lags of the dependent variables as the 
explanatory variables. This is considering that analysts may not revise their monthly 
earnings forecast until the information of the next quarterly earnings announcement is 
released. Moreover, the period between one quarterly earnings announcement to the
2 Chaney et. al (1999) investigates the effect o f  reporting restructuring charges on analysts’ forecast 
revisions and errors and uses firm -quarters observation since the majority o f  the restructuring charges 
are usually announced sim ultaneously with a quarterly earnings announcem ent.
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
next quarterly earnings announcement is three months. Besides, prior research, such 
as Lys and Sohn (1990), disclosed positive serial correlation of consecutive analysts’ 
earnings forecasts revisions. The inclusion o f the lags o f the dependent variable as the 
explanatory variables may reduce autocorrelation in the estimation.
The next three explanatory variables, such as Loss, UE, and Loss*UE, are our 
control variables to capture why analysts revise their forecasts even during the 
periods when there is no dumping investigation. Following Ali (1992), Klein (1990) 
and Chaney et al (1999), we include a variable Loss in our estimation, because a 
recent loss may affect analysts’ forecast revisions. We expect that the coefficient of 
variable LOSS would be negative if analysts perceive that current period loss would 
affect the whole year earnings. In addition to controlling for a recent loss, we also 
include an indicator variable for the presence of unexpected earnings. The unexpected 
earnings are calculated as the quarterly actual earnings minus the most recent 
quarterly analysts’ forecast. We set unexpected earnings equal to zero for the months 
where there are no quarterly earnings announcements. During the months prior to the 
quarterly earnings announcement, there is no information about the quarterly earnings 
if  none are announced. Hence, unexpected earnings are equal to zero. When the firm 
announces its quarterly earnings in month t, then unexpected earnings is the 
discrepancy between the actual earnings and the most recent forecast for that quarter. 
Analysts may respond to the unexpected earnings by revising their forecast at time 
t+1. For the months after t+1, the unexpected earnings are set equal to zero again until 
the next quarterly announcement. We expect that the coefficient on UE would be 
positive. If the unexpected earnings for a recent quarter are positive, this indicates
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that the analysts were too pessimistic in their forecast of a recent quarter. Moreover, if 
analysts perceive that these unexpected earnings will persist into the future, then 
analysts would revise their whole year earnings upward. Following to Chaney et al
(1999), we include an interactive term for loss and unexpected earnings (LOSS*UE) 
with the expectation that the analysts’ response to unexpected earnings may be 
different in the presence of loss. Also, a loss may make an affirmative AD verdict 
more likely. With a loss, injury may be more evident. If analysts believe that the 
information about a loss in a recent quarter dominates the discrepancy between the 
actual quarterly earnings and their forecast, then we would expect that the coefficient 
on LOSS*UE would be negative.
It is known that the basic structure of an antidumping investigation may consist 
o f as many as five events, which consist of filing plus four investigative decisions, in 
which the information is transmitted to the market participants. We examine how 
important each decision is from the perspective of financial analysts. We consider the 
filing to be the first important date. The domestic industry may initiate an 
investigation by filing a petition simultaneously with the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC) and the Department of Commerce (DoC), in which the industry 
or union or trade association claims it has suffered material injury by reason of 
dumped imports from foreign countries. This injury may be represented by the loss of 
market share and/or profit, sales, inventory, employment, etc (Devault, 1993 ). For
this reason, we include a dummy variable, D l, which corresponds to the filing 
decision date. We cannot consider a sufficiency decision as an important decision 
date since it happens within just 2 0  days, which is less than a month, after the
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industry initiates a filing. This is because our financial analysts’ earnings forecast 
revisions variable is based on the I/B/E/S consensus earnings released one month 
after and before the month o f the decision date.
The second important decision date is when the USITC concludes its preliminary 
investigation, which occurs 45 days after the filing date. The USITC makes a 
preliminary decision whether or not the domestic industry is materially injured by 
reason of dumped imports. If the material injury decision is negative, the 
investigation ends. If it is affirmative, the DoC conducts a preliminary dumping 
investigation o f the alleged dumpers. The dumping margin is equal to the percentage 
difference between the export prices charged by the accused foreign firms in the 
United States and their home market prices. Or, in the case of sales at a loss, 
incomplete data, or refusal to comply, it is the difference between the constructed 
value and the export price. To capture the importance of the USITC preliminary 
decision to the revisions o f analysts’ earnings forecast, we include the dummy 
variables D2 and D3. The dummy variable D2 denotes the negative outcome of the 
USITC preliminary verdict in the firm-month observations, while the dummy variable 
D3 represents the affirmative outcome of the USITC preliminary decision. The 
former is equal to one if the USITC preliminary decision happens to be negative in 
that firm-month observation and zero otherwise, while the latter is equal to one if the 
decision is affirmative and zero otherwise. The coefficient o f D2 is the marginal 
effect o f the USITC preliminary NEGATIVE decision to the analysts’ earnings 
forecast revisions, while the coefficient of D3 is the marginal effect o f the USITC 
preliminary AFFIRMATIVE decision to the analysts’ earnings forecast revisions.
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The third important decision is when the DoC makes a preliminary decision 
regarding dumping margins for the accused foreign firms, which by statute must be 
released within 160 days o f the filing date. This decision happens if  the USITC 
preliminary decision regarding material injury is affirmative. We include a dummy 
variable, D4, to capture whether there is analysts’ reaction to the DoC preliminary 
verdict. D4 is equal to one if the DoC preliminary happens in that firm-month 
observation and zero otherwise. Irrespective o f the DoC preliminary dumping 
decision, DoC must make a final decision regarding the dumping margin within 235 
days after the filing. To capture how analysts respond to DoC final decision, we 
include a dummy variable, D5. If the DoC preliminary happens in that firm-month 
observation, then D5 is equal to one and zero otherwise. All the DoC preliminaries 
are positive, so a single dummy is used.
The last decision is when the USITC makes a final injury assessment that must 
be made 280 days after the filing. To capture the importance o f the USITC final 
decision to the revisions o f analysts’ earnings forecast, we include the dummy 
variables D6  and D7. The dummy variable D6  characterizes the negative decision of 
the USITC final verdict in the firm-quarter observations, while the dummy variable 
D7 corresponds to the affirmative outcome o f the USITC final decision. The former is 
equal to one if  the USITC final decision happens to be negative in that firm-month 
observation and zero otherwise, while the latter is equal to one if the decision is 
affirmative and zero otherwise. With these two dummy variables, the explanation of 
the marginal effect o f the USITC final verdict is similar to the marginal effect o f the 
USITC preliminary verdict. The coefficient o f D6  is the marginal effect o f the USITC
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final NEGATIVE decision to the analysts’ earnings forecast revisions, while the 
coefficient o f D7 is the marginal effect o f the USITC final AFFIRMATIVE decision 
to the analysts’ earnings forecast revisions.
We incorporate firm specific effects in order to allow for firm specific 
unobservable heterogeneity, for example, the quality o f firm management, the 
importance of petitioned products to firm, etc. Although we differenced the mean of 
analysts’ forecast revision in our dependent variable, the heterogeneity or the 
variability of analysts’ forecast revision may possibly arise from the variability of 
stock prices among the firms since we deflated analysts’ forecast revision by the 
stock price. We also include the monthly time dummy variable to control for the 
potential impact of economy-wide factors such as the business cycle, federal fiscal 
and monetary policy, supply shock, and exchange rate fluctuations to the analysts’ 
forecast revision. These factors may affect real output, market demand, and 
competition, which further influence firms’ activity and analysts’ response to firms’ 
earnings, especially during the months without a dumping investigation.
s u is the error term, which for simplicity, we assume that it follows an AR(1) 
process with a zero mean.
In terms of setting up the hypotheses, it is difficult to predict the sign of each of 
the dummy coefficients of the AD petition investigation (Dl through D7). This is 
because the AD petition investigation is a standard procedural basis. Moreover, there 
is a tendency in our sample that unless the ITC concluded a negative decision in its 
preliminary decision, the investigation will likely to continue through the ITC Final 
stage. We would expect that the ITC preliminary decision would be important from
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the point of view of analysts’ expectation. Analysts may have formed their 
expectation in advance of the complaint’s date for investigations that completely 
continue through the final decision. However, when the ITC preliminary decision is 
negative, this would be an important signal to the analysts about the prospect of the 
firms’ earnings. We would expect that when the ITC Preliminary turns out to be 
negative, analysts would revise their one year ahead earnings forecast downward, on 
average. This is because analysts were looking both backward and forward about the 
one year ahead earnings. The next one year earnings have not been announced yet, 
but the first and second quarter o f that one year horizon may have already been 
revealed. Another reason is when a firm files a petition, this is a signal that the firm is 
possibly experiencing an injury. We would also expect that when the probability that 
the duties being imposed on the foreign firms are higher, or when AD duties are 
expected to be high, that analysts would revise their second year earnings upward. 
This is because the benefit of complaints, if  any, would be effective after 280 days of 
the investigation period. It is also possible that there would be a within-investigation 
effect. For more thorough analysis, see Staiger and Wolak’s (1994) discussion of 
process and outcome filers.
III.7. Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors
In addition to examining analysts’ response to the filing of AD petitions and the 
verdicts o f the investigation through the predictions o f future earnings, we assess 
analysts’ accuracy and bias in forecasting future earnings, subsequent to filing an AD 
petition. If filing AD petitions transmit a signal to the market participants about the
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healthiness o f a firm, besides investigating how analysts respond to the signal, it 
would be interesting to compare analysts’ forecast errors prior and subsequent to an 
AD petition. In other words, we would like to know whether there is any effect of 
filing an AD petition to the accuracy and bias of the analysts’ forecasts.
We use annual earnings and define the analysts’ forecast error in the year 
subsequent to the filing of an AD petition as the difference between actual earnings 
and the most recent mean forecast.
EPS..., -  FEPS n+\
(3.3) AFenll+l=  --------- - ,
* i , t + \
where
AFerrl l+i = The analysts’ forecast error for year t+1 for firm i, 
Actual earnings per share for year t+1 for firm i,
FEPSi,i+i = The mean earnings forecast for year t+1 measured in the 
month prior to the annual earnings announcement for year t+1 
for firm i,
Pl l+l = The market price of the stock of firm i at the beginning of year 
t+ 1 .
III.8. Empirical Regression on Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors
in Relation to the Learning of the Filing of Antidumping Petitions
To consider the accuracy and bias of analysts’ forecasts subsequent to filing 
AD petition, we, again, follow Chaney et al (1999). We estimate the regression using
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both absolute values o f forecast errors and actual forecast errors to assess accuracy 
and bias, respectively,
where
|^F e/r(_(+]| = The absolute value o f the analysts’ forecast error for firm i for
year t+1, the year after filing o f an AD petition,
AFerrjl+] = The analysts’ forecast error for firm i for year t+1, the year
after filing of an AD petition,
| AFerri t_x | = The absolute value o f the analysts’ forecast error for firm i for
year t-1, the year before filing o f an AD petition,
AFerrjt_x = The analysts’ forecast error for firm i for year t+1, the year
before filing o f an AD petition,
Filings = 1 if  the firm i filed an AD petition in year t, 0 otherwise,
l n a ^  =  Log of the number o f analysts forecasting earnings for a given firm i in
(3.4)
\AFerril+, | = y\AFerr(l_x \ + SFiling,, + «, LNA,,+I + a 2 R ,̂+]
+ M ( f ) +  A r ( / ) + 7 , , +1
(3.5)
AFerr,,l+] =yAFerrlt_] + SFiling „ + a lLNAiJ+, + a 2R ^ l
+ ^ ( / ) + A y(/)+77,-,+i
year t+ 1 ,
R l̂+l =  Market return from the beginning to the end of period t+1, 
M ( / )  = Firm specific effects,
A Y(t) =  Time effects (yearly),
7 / (+1 = The error term which is assumed to be normally distributed (0,V).
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We include the lagged forecast error in view of prior research showing the 
positive serial correlation in analysts’ forecast errors of annual earnings. The 
examples are Ali et al (1992) and Lys and Sohn (1990). Their findings suggest that 
analysts fail to learn fully from their own past errors. We use analysts’ forecast errors 
from the year t-1, the year prior to filing AD petition AFerrn_{ instead of the year t,
the year o f the filing AD petition AFerrlt because it is not obvious whether or not the
analysts’ forecasts for year t incorporate any expectation of filing an AD petition in 
year t.
Alford and Berger (1998) document that the level o f analysts’ following is highly 
associated with the accuracy of analysts’ forecast. Lys and Soo (1995) examine 
empirically the effect o f the number of analysts’ following a firm on analysts’ 
forecast errors, and find that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy increases with the 
number o f analysts following the firm. Moreover, they also argue the number of 
analysts following potential proxies for both the intensity of competition in the 
market and the amount of information revealed by the research o f other analysts. As 
such, we include a variable for the log of the number of analysts (LNA) to capture the 
effect o f analysts’ following on the accuracy and bias o f the analysts’ prediction. We 
would expect that the coefficient on LNA would be negative.
We include the variable RM as a control variable (Ali et al, 1996, and Chaney et 
al, 1999). If analysts’ forecasts are efficient, however, they should reflect all 
information revealed in past stock returns about future earnings. We would expect the 
coefficient on market return to be zero. Thus, RM is a test for market efficiency.
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The last two variables are firm specific effects and yearly time effects. We 
included the firm specific effect in the sense that the heterogeneity among the firms 
may exist due to differences in managerial quality, differences in the importance of 
product to petitioners, and the variability in price deflation in our dependent variable. 
We also included the yearly time dummy variable to control for the potential impact 
of the changing economic activity on forecast errors. In the estimation process, we 
will test whether it is necessary or not to include these two variables, since we may 
have a pooling regression with one intercept. Testing for the significance o f group 
fixed effects and time effects are explained in Chapter IV.3.
77, ,+1 is the error term with (0,F). We assume that the disturbance term follows
an AR(1) process such that 77, ,+l = prj, t + uu+l where u,. ,+I ~ (o,<t„2 ).
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This chapter provides the explanation of the econometric issues and techniques 
that we believe appropriate to our regression model discussed in Chapter III. Section
IV.2 presents the general issues when dealing with a time series cross-section model. 
The next four sections, which are Section IV.3, Section IV.4, Section IV.5 and 
Section IV.6 , explain the test procedures of the group effects, autocorrelation, panel 
heteroscedasticity and the possibility of cross-sectional correlation in the error 
structure, respectively. Section IV.7 describes the endogeneity test as to whether one 
of the explanatory variables is correlated with the error term. Section IV .8  invokes the 
Hausman test to check whether the fixed or the random effects are most appropriate 
to our model. Section V.9 explains the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
technique if the error terms satisfy the autocorrelation assumption. Section IV. 10 
describes the Feasible GLS techniques if the error disturbance follows both 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the structures. Section IV. 11 presents 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors if  the error 
structure exhibits autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional correlation, 
in contrast to the Feasible GLS methods, as discussed in more detail in Beck and Katz 
(1995, 2001). Section IV .12 lays out the existence of biases in dynamic models with 
common first order autoregressive, AR(1), disturbance process and fixed effects. This 
topic is explained in more detail in Nickell (1981). Section IV. 13 discusses the issues
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of the application of instrumental variables. Section IV. 14 and IV. 15 describe the 
estimation procedure o f the analysts’ earnings forecast revisions model and the 
estimation procedure o f the analysts’ forecast errors model, respectively.
IV.2. Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) Model
The general questions in dealing with pooling time series and cross-section 
(TSCS) data are the appropriate restriction of the error structure, and whether there 
are fixed or random effects. If the errors are assumed to be spherical, which is usually 
not the case for the TSCS model, then TSCS should be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), and OLS will provide correct standard errors. Under the spherical 
disturbance, we assume that all o f the error processes have the same variance 
(homoscedasticity), and they are independent of one another. The latter can be 
interpreted as no serial and/or spatial (contemporaneous) correlation. Whenever one 
o f these assumptions is violated, the error structures become non-spherical. Under the 
structure o f non-spherical disturbances, OLS is not optimal in the sense that there will 
be other more-efficient estimators. Under the fixed effect approach, the intercept is 
assumed to be a group or individual-specific constant term, while under the random 
effect approach, the intercept is assumed to be a group-specific disturbance.
Let equations (3.2) or (3.4) or (3.5) in the previous chapter be written in general 
form as
(4.1) y it = x ilj3 + s l l ; i = 1,...,  N; t  = ,
where x ,, is a vector o f k exogenous variables, and observations are indexed by both 
group (/) and time (t). The exogenous variables may contain group-specific dummy
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variables, allowing intercepts to vary by group (fixed) effect. The group (fixed) 
effects include both firm effect and time effect. The x ,, may also include the lagged 
values of the dependent variable (Dynamic model). We denote the NTxNT positive 
definite covariance matrix of the errors with typical element E{st ,, Sj s) by V.
Following Kmenta (1971), Equation (4.1) can be written in general form as
(4.2) y  = Xj3 + e ,
where
' Y n ' * 1 1 . 2  ' "  * „ . /
Y u * ■ 2 . , * 1 2 . 2  • "  * , 2 . ,
Y vr
*  =
* I 7 \ I * 17,2 -  * , 7 . ,
Y * * 2 , . , * 2 , . 2  • -  * 2 1 , X
y 22 * 2 2 . 1 * 2 2 , 2  • -  * 2 2 . ,




‘ f i x
s \ r , and j8  = P 2
S 2 \ '■
S 22 A
S N T _
and the V matrix is expressed by
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(4.3)
'  £(*>.) £ (* 11*12) • £ (* 11*17-) £ (* 11*21) £(*, | ̂ 22 ) £(*11£ N T  )
E { s  12̂ 11 ) E ( £ n )  ■ E { s x l e x r ) £ (* 12*21) £ (* 12*22) E ( £ \ 2£ N T  )
E ( s \ T s  „ ) E ( s x t £ x 1 ) • £ (4 ) £(*ir *21) £ (* 17*22) E { £ \ t £ n t )
£ (* 21*11 ) £ (* 21*12) £ (* 21*17-) £ (*2.) £ (* 2.*22) • £ (* 21*ot)
£ (* 22*11 ) £ (* 22*1 2)  ' £ (* 22*17) £ (* 22*21 ) £ (* 22) • £ (* 22*777)
E ( £ n j  £ || ) E { s n t £ { 2 )  ■ £(*yw-*ir) £(*,V7'*21 ) £(*/V'/'*22 ) • £ (4 r) .
Different specification of the V matrix leads to different estimation techniques when 
dealing with pooled TSCS data.
Before we proceed to the estimation techniques for our regression model, we will 
conduct the testing for the significance o f the group effect and testing for the 
significance o f the errors structure. The latter can be broken down into the error 
structure o f autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and/or cross-sectional correlation. It is 
important to be able to detect whether there exists heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation in the error structures, and to develop alternative inference and 
estimation procedures. Although the use o f OLS in the regression equation will 
produce an unbiased estimator, when the error terms are heteroscedastic or 
autocorrelated, it is no longer efficient. It is not the best unbiased linear estimator 
of 13. Moreover, the standard errors usually computed for the OLS estimator are no 
longer appropriate and are going to lead to the incorrect calculation of the confidence 
interval and a misleading hypothesis test. We also check for the possibility of the 
cross-sectional correlation in the error structure. As explained in Chapter IV. 11, if the
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error structure exhibits autocorrelation, heteroscedasticty, and cross-sectional 
correlation then FGLS will not be valid unless we have a very large time series (T), 
compared to the number o f cross-sections (N). However, this is not the case in our 
model. Moreover, FGLS can not be applied if T < N. Beck and Katz (1995) proposed 
OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Error.
IV.3. Testing for the Significance of the Fixed Effect
Greene (2000), on page 562, discusses the technique for testing for the existence 
of differences across groups. The significance of the group effect can be tested with 
an F test for the hypotheses that the constant terms are equal. Under the null 
hypothesis, the efficient estimator is pooled least squares. The F test is
where R, u and p  indicate the regression sum of squares, unrestricted model and 
pooled model, respectively. The pooled model is the restricted model with only a 
single overall constant term.
IV.4. Testing for the Significance of the Autocorrelation
Johnston and Dinardo (1997), on pages 182-183, discuss a Durbin-h test for a 
regression containing lagged dependent variables. Consider the relation
(4.5) y, = + • • • + firy,_r + /?,+1x„ + • • • + fir+xxsl + e , ,
with et = + m, , \p\ < 1 and u ~ N { 0 , a ] l ) .
40
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Durbin’s basic result is that under the null hypothesis, H0 : p  = 0. The procedure is 
the following:
First, estimate the OLS regression of eq. (4.4) and obtain the residuals e’s. 
Second, estimate the OLS regression of 
e, on e,_x,y,_x, ... , y , . r , x ]t, ... ,x „ .
Third, if  the coefficient o f e,_, in this regression is significantly different from
zero by the usual t-test, reject the null hypothesis, H0: p  = 0.
IV.5. Testing for the Heteroscedasticity in the Panel
Examination of the analysts’ forecast revisions and unexpected earnings suggests 
variation in its scales. The unexpected earnings tend to be smaller for larger firms and 
larger for smaller firms. This makes sense because larger firms tend to be followed by 
larger number o f more qualified analysts. On the other hand, smaller firms tend to be 
followed by a fewer number of less qualified analysts. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon
(2000) found that “inexperienced analysts are more likely to be terminated for 
inaccurate earnings forecast then their more experienced counterparts” (p. 121).
Greene (2000), on page 511, discusses the tests for heteroscedasticity in panel 
data. We can relax the classical assumption by allowing a 2 to vary across /. Under 
the null hypothesis H0: <r2 = c r 2 V i  = 1 , . . . ,N  , the test statistic is given by:
(4.6) NT l n &2 a 2 ~ X l „
1=1
where &) = Z Z ^ / W T
<=i i=i
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V - h l ' T
i=1
Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic given in equation (4.6) has a limiting chi- 
squared distribution with (jV-1) degrees of freedom.
IV.6. Testing for the Significance of the Cross-Sectional Correlation
We have many different AD petition investigations constructing our panel data. 
Each petition involves different firms and a different number o f firms. It is possible 
that different firms are followed by the same analysts. It is also likely that from the 
analysts’ forecast point of view, the macroeconomics factors such as the business 
cycle, federal fiscal and monetary policy, supply shock, and exchange rate fluctuation 
that influence these firms affect them all to varying degrees. As such, it would be 
reasonable to assume correlation of the disturbance across firms.
As explained in Greene (2000) on p. 601, we can use the Lagrange multiplier test 
developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) with the test statistics:
N  i - l
(4.7) with N  as the number of cross-section,
;=2 7=1 ~ ~
where r* is the ijth residual correlation coefficient between / and j  computed from 
the OLS residual and given by:
<j2 i 7
(4.8) r 2 = - r ^ r -  with & = -  £  elte for i,j = 1,2,3...
IV.7. Testing for Endogeneity
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We start with the analysts’ earnings forecast revision model as expressed in (4.2). 
We denote the potentially endogenous lagged dependent variables in the explanatory 
variable. As explained in Wooldridge (2002) on page 120, the procedure o f the 
endogeneity test is as follows: First, regress the suspected endogenous variable on all 
the exogenous variables and the instrument variables. We choose the lags of the 
exogenous variables as the instruments, and obtain the residual u . Next, lag it three 
times such that we have l>, , u2, and l>3. Then, we simply include u , , u2, and v 3 in 
the original regression equation and use an F test to examine whether the coefficients 
of o , , u2, and o3 are simultaneously equal to zero. The significance of the F statistics 
will indicate whether or not our suspected variables are endogenous.
IV.8. Hausman Test Whether Fixed Effects or Random Effects
To test whether fixed effects or random effects are most appropriate to our 
regression model, we implement the Hausman (1978) test to compare the random 
effects and the fixed effects estimators. The Hausman statistics are distributed as 
X 1 with K degrees of freedom. K is the number of common coefficients in the model 
being compared. The statistic is computed as
(4.9) H  = (A * -  h a  )' F (A * , -  H P  an ) f  (A * “  At* ) •
We will conduct all six of the specification tests explained previously into our 
regression models. We have three regression models: the regression of analysts’ 
forecasts revision [equation (3.2)], the regression of the accuracy o f analysts’ 
forecasts [equation (3.4)], and the regression of the bias direction of analysts’ 
forecasts [equation (3.5)]. Based on these test results, we can invoke the appropriate
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technique in the estimation. As we know in the TSCS model, different assumptions 
about the error processes lead to different methods of estimation. The following are 
the estimation techniques for each particular structure o f the error term that are 
relevant to our regression model.
IV.9. Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation of the 
“A utocorrelated” Model3
Consider the generic TSCS model:
(4.10) y t = X lfi + e i , i =1,2, ...,N 
where:
y j is a Txl vector of observations on the /th “group;”
X t is a TxK matrix of observations on exogenous variables (including fixed 
firm and time effects) for the /th group; 
y3 is a Kxl vector of coefficients; and 
£•, is a Txl vector of error terms.







y n . . £ n _
, or y  = Xfi  + s ,
where s  ~ N(0, V) with F is a  positive definite variance-covariance matrix. 
The particular characterizations of the autocorrelation model are
3 All estim ation procedures com e from Dr. Bob Reed’s econometrics class-notes.
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e {s 2) = cr2 (Homoscedasticity),
(4.12) E{sjtSjt )=  0 (Cross-sectional independence, no contemporaneous
correlation), 
s u = p e i t_x + u„ (first order autocorrelation),
where s jt is the error term associated with an observation of the /th group at time t.
The key assumption in our model is we let s u be an autoregressive common process
of order one [AR(I)J, so that eit = p s it_x + u it, where uu is a classical error term
characterized by mean zero and variance c 2 . With the stationary assumption, it can 
be shown that
(4.13) var(£„) = < ,  =-EL.
1 ~ p
By making the appropriate substitution, we find that
0  • • o ' 0 0
(4.14) V =
0 ^2 • • 0 =
0 <Jf,2^2 0
0 • • V*. 0 0 ^C.N^N
where
1 - p 2
1 p p 2 p 3 ... p'- '
p 1 p p 2 ... p ”
P ‘ p 1 p ...
• . . .  p
p 7'-' p 72 p 7'-3 . . . p  1
and each of the O's represents a TxT matrix o f zeros.
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Since equation (4.14) is a diagonal square matrix, then the inverse of the 
V matrix is
(4.15) V~' =





= I T, we can find that
—....... = ,r-
'  1 - p 0 o •• • 0 0 0 '
~ P 1+ p 2 ~ P o •• • 0 0 0
0 - p \ + p 2 - p  ■■• 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 •• • ~ P \ + p 2 - p
0 0 0 0 •• 0 ~ P 1
Since Vt ,i  = l,.. .,N is a positive definite variance-covariance matrix, its inverse is 
positive definite. Therefore, it is possible to find a nonsingular matrix Pi such that 
(4.17) Pj Pj -  V~'.
It can be seen that the matrix
y / l - p 2 0 0 0 • • 0 0
> 5 - 4 -
~ P 1 0 0 • • 0 0
(4.18) 0 - p 1 0 • • 0 0
0 0 0 0 • • - p 1_
satisfies the condition in equation (4.17).
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Now, let’s consider equation (4.11) y = X f l + s  where s ~  N(0,V).  Since V is 
positive definite, there exists a non-singular matrix P  such that
(4.19) V~X= P ' P .
If we pre-multiply the equation y  = X p  + s  by P  we get
(4.20) Py = PXfi + P s .
Under the classical assumptions, this transformed equation satisfies the conditions 
under which OLS is BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators).4 
It can also be proved that OLS applied to the transformed equation Py  = PXfi  + Pe  
produces the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator of /?, bGIS :5
(4.21) baLS = ( x ' V - lx Y x ' V - ' y  with
(4.22) VarbaLS= { x ' V - lX y .
However, we have a limited knowledge about the elements of the V matrix. 
Therefore, it is important to develop Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimators, for which consistent estimates are substituted for unknown parameters.
The common procedure in implementing FGLS is to begin with a natural 
estimator o f p , called p . According to Greene (2000), to get the estimate o f p  we 
can use:
(4.23) p  = ^- j , --------,
5 > i
1=2
4 Proof, see A ppendix A -l. All proofs com e from Dr. Bob Reed’s econom etrics class-notes, Greene 
(2000), and Johnston and Dinardo (1997)
5 Proof, see A ppendix A-2
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which is the least squares estimator o f p  in s it = p s it_x + un , where w„ is a classical 
error term characterized by mean zero and variance . The second step is to use the 








where each o f the O's represents a T x T  matrix of zeros and P* , i - 1, ... , N , i s a T x  
T matrix given by
^ - p 2 0 0 0 • • 0 0
- p 1 0 0 • • 0 0
(4.25) p;  = 0 ~ P 1 0 • • 0 0
0 0 0 0 • • - p 1
As we have shown previously, pre-multiplying y  = Xf3 + e  by P* produces the 
transformed variables as explained by Kmenta (1971) as
(4.26) y ; = PX„, \  + A K a  + • • • + PkKjk  + < ,
where Y* = ~J\- p 2Ylt for t= 1,
y ; = y * - p y /if., f a  1= 2 , 3 , . . .  , t ,
and X], = ^ \ -  p 1 X n fo r /= l ,
x l  = x « ~ PX i,<-\ for t = 2 , 3 , . . . , T ,  
k= \ , 2 , , K,
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Moreover, as we have previously indicated that the invocation of OLS to this 
transformed equation produces BLUE estimators, we can prove that6
(4.27) K<w(p'£)=<7,2/ „ .
The third step of the FGLS estimation is to apply OLS to the transformed equation 
(4.26) P"y = P*Xf3 + P 'e  and to obtain the residual vector.
(4.28) u =
and to use this residual vector to estimate
(4.29) &l =
u u
N T - K
The fourth step o f the estimation is to use p  and cr2 to estimate (cr2Q () as
expressed in equation (4.14), and to use the results to calculate V~' as given in 
equations (4.15) and (4.16).
Finally, we use V~' to calculate b(!LS and VarbGLS as expressed in equation (4.21) 
and (4.22), respectively.
IV.10. Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation of the 
“Groupwise Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelated” Model
This model is based on the following characterization:
6 Proof, see Appendix A-3
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E { s l ) = cr,2 (Heteroscedasticity),
(4.30) E[euSjl )=  0 (Cross-sectional independence, no contemporaneous
correlation),
£■„ = p s Kl-\ + (first order autocorrelation),
_2 X
where «„ ~ vv(o, cr2,.), and e u ~ N
cr,
0,
1 - p 2
The procedure of FGLS estimation for this model is similar to the estimation steps for 
the “Autocorrelated” model except for the following:
(4.31) a ) t = K ,r (* „ > )= -^ 4 - ,
1 -  P
instead of equation (4.13)
The issue here is how would we estimate the group specific variance 
a u,i , i  = l , 2 , . . . , N ?
This can be estimated using
.2 uiui
(4.32) < , = Y T i -
Once we have obtained p  and <j2,, we use these two estimators to estimate (cr2Q ,)
* 1as given in equation (4.14) and use the results to calculate V~ as expressed in 
equation (4.15) and (4.16).
Finally, we use V~x to calculate bGLS and Var bGIS as expressed in equation (4.21) 
and (4.22), respectively.
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IV .ll. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
When the Error Structure Exhibits Autocorrelation, Heteroscedasticity 
and Cross-Sectional Correlation
Sub-chapter IV.9 and IV. 10 above discuss the Feasible GLS estimation if the 
error structure exhibits autocorrelation and both autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, respectively. The question is what happens to the method of FGLS 
estimation if the error structure exhibits autocorrelation, groupwise heteroscedasticity 
and cross-sectional correlation. In the econometrics literature, the FGLS under this 
error structure is called the Parks or Parks-Kmenta model. The short answer is, 
according to Beck and Katz (1995, 2001), under this circumstance, the FGLS fails in 
the sense that the FGLS underestimates the true standard error, unless we have a very 
large time series (T) compared to the number o f cross-sections (N). However, this is 
not the case in our model.
Feasible Generalized Least Squares was originally introduced by Richard Parks 
in 1967 in his paper, “Efficient Estimation of a System o f Regression Equations 
When Disturbances Are Both Serially and Contemporaneously Correlated,” published 
in the Journal o f  American Statistical Association, vol.62. This method was further 
popularized in Kmenta’s text. Therefore, the FGLS method is sometimes referred to 
as the Parks-Kmenta method, Parks method, or Kmenta method.
Hereafter, the Parks-Kmenta method is FGLS for TSCS model where the error 
structure shows unit-specific serial correlation, panel heteroscedasticity, and cross- 
sectional correlation.
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Beck and Katz (1995, 2001) show that the FGLS approach of the Parks-Kmenta 
method that we discussed previously produces the extreme overconfidence of the 
standard errors, which can lead to dramatic underestimates of the true parameter 
variability in the finding of TSCS studies. As Beck and Katz (1995) pointed out:
The FGLS formula for standard errors, however, assumes that the 
error process is known, not estimated. In many applications this is not a 
problem because the error process has few enough parameters that they 
can be well estimated. Such is not the case for TSCS models, where the 
error process has a large number of parameters. This oversight causes 
estimates o f the standard errors o f the estimated coefficients to 
understate their true variability, (p. 634)
Beck and Katz provide evidence using simulated data from Monte Carlo experiments 
that the Parks-Kmenta method of GLS falsely inflates confidence of the estimated 
coefficients. This will lead to the incorrect statistical tests.
As Beck and Katz (1995) say in their conclusion, “ ... the downward bias in 
standard errors makes the Parks technique unusable unless there are substantially 
more time period (T) then there are cross-sectional units (N)” (p. 644).
Although OLS does not give correct standard errors for non spherical 
disturbances, OLS is still consistent. Having shown the problems of the Parks- 
Kmenta FGLS approach, Beck and Katz advocate a simpler method for estimating 
TSCS models by retaining OLS parameter estimates, but replacing the OLS standard 
errors with panel corrected standard errors and using common serial correlation ( p ) 
instead o f unit specific serial correlation ( p , ).
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(4.33) P  = { x x Y x y ,
(4.34) Cov(p)={x'xY{x'Vx\x'x).
Based on these findings, we also invoke the Beck and Katz (1995) approach into our 
regression model if the error structure shows autocorrelation, panel 
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Following Beck and Katz (1995), we use common first order autocorrelation 
where = p } -  p .
IV.12. Biases in Dynamic Model With AR(1) Disturbance Process and Fixed 
Effects
7 Proof, see Appendix A-4
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Greene (2000) shows that if  the regression contains any lagged dependent 
variables and the error term satisfies an AR(1) process, then OLS will be biased and 
inconsistent.
Consider the following:
(4.37) y, = + £,,
where s, = p s t_x + u , ,  u, ~ /./.c/(o,<r^).
Suppose that \0\ < 1 and|/?| < 1.
In this model y , represents the deviation from its sample mean, i.e. y, = Y , - Y . It 
can be seen from equation (4.37) that this model contains a lagged dependent variable 
as an explanatory variable. This model has also an error term that follows a classical 
AR(1) process. According to Greene (2000), the regressor and the disturbance in this 
model are correlated as the following explanation shows.
(4.38) Cov(yl_i ,£ l ) = Cov(yl_l ,ps,_] + « ,)
= pCov(y,_l , e l_l )
= p C o v { y , , £ , ) ,
where we have now simply used the fact that the process is stationary 
Cov(y,_,, u,) = 0 and Cov(y ,, s , ) = Cov{y,_x, s t_,).
Also
(4.39) Cov(y , , s , )  = Cov(j3y,_, + £ , , £ , )
= J3 Cov(^,_,, ) + Cov(£,, £,)
= p C o v { y , A ,e , )+Var(s , ) .
Combining equation (4.38) and (4.39) yields
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(4.40) Cov(y,_, ,£ ,)  = p P  Cov(yf_,, s , ) ■+ p a ] .
We have shown previously [equation (4.13)] that for an AR(1) process:
_2
s , ) = a E = — u— , then equation (4.40) becomes
1 - p
It is obvious from (4.41) that Cov(yl_], s , ) is zero if p  -  0 , regardless o f /?.
Define (3 as the OLS estimator o f /? in equation (4.37) as
n




then we can prove that8
(4.43) p\\m(S = p + Cof >,'-"£' \
n->oo Vary y t j
From (4.37) we know that Var{y,) = f i 2 Var{yt^)+Var{£ t ) + 2 p C o v { y l_x, s l ).
Knowing that the process is stationary and using (4.13) and (4.41), it can be shown 
that
(4-44) Va r M = (iJ ^ _ f i p y  
Substituting (4.44) into (4.43) and using (4.41) yields
(4.45) p \ \ m p  = p + ^  f \
/J—>00 1 +  pp
Proof, see Appendix A-5
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It is clear from (4.45) that unless p  -  0, OLS will be inconsistent.
Nickel (1981) shows an additional source of bias in the presence o f both fixed 
effects and an error term that follows an autoregressive common process of order 1 
(AR(1)). Nickel starts with the following equations:
(4.46) y„ = P  + p y , tA + £ /? ,* ,,, + / ,  +u„ i =
j
and
(4-47) y„ = P  + Y JPJxiJI + 1  + £„ , i = = l , . . . , T
j
(4.48) s H = p s iJ_] +u, ,,
where u, ~ id.dip,a]) ,  f t is fixed parameter, and \p\ < 1 by assumption.
It can be shown that equations (4.46) and (4.47) share a similar structure. Step 
one, replacing £jt in (4.47) by (4.48). Step two, solving for s il_] as a function of
y ttA, P , x jjt_x, and f t using (4.47). Step three, substitute the expression for 
from step two into the expression for y n from step one, yields
(4.49) y„ = p { l - p ) + p  j v ,  + Z P j (*!/< " P xvj-i ) + f i ( l ~ P ) + £u •
j
Equation (4.49) makes clear that equation (4.46) and (4.47) have the same structure.
Nickel (1981) shows the asymptotic biases in the AR(1) disturbance model 
estimated by OLS using fixed effects, and Greene (2000) on page 583 states that “In 
the dynamic regression m odel... the finite sample bias is of order 1/T.”
The conclusion that we can draw from the Greene (2000) and Nickel (1981) 
findings is that the presence of both fixed effects and lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables introduces bias. Moreover, there will be an additional source of
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bias if the error term is correlated. This suggests some possible instruments for 
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation o f the model. The treatment is the same when 
one or more o f the explanatory variables are endogenous.
IV.13. Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation Using Instrumental 
Variables
One of the major assumptions in the utilization of OLS is that there is no 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. If this assumption is 
violated, based on the test as explained in sub chapter V.7, OLS will neither be 
unbiased nor consistent.
Consider y  = Xf.3 + u where u ~ v(o,<x2/) .  Let’s denote
as a finite matrix of full rank, and
which states that the error term is correlated with one or more of the explanatory 
variables. This may occur when one o f the regressors is an endogenous variable; 
when there are lagged dependent variables and fixed effects; when there are fixed 
effects and autocorrelated disturbances; or when there are lagged dependent variables, 
fixed effects and an autocorrelated error term. We can prove that the OLS estimation 
of the model y  = X/J + u will produce inconsistent estimates of /?.
Let b be the OLS estimator, b = ( x ' x ) x ' y ,  then
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f x ' x \-1 • p  lim ( v'  \X  u
I  n ) M—>00 I  "  J
b = f3 + ( x ’x Y  X'u  
giving
pWxnb = j3 + p lim
n ~ +  c o  ^ 3 —> 0 0
Using (4.47) and (4.48) gives
(4,52)P lim4 = A + Z i Z v .  * P -
>oo
This result shows that the correlation of one or more of the explanatory variables with 
the disturbance term makes the OLS estimates inconsistent. This suggests the seeking 
of consistent estimators, which may be obtained by the use o f instrumental variables 
(IV) or instruments.
Suppose that there exists a matrix Z, having the same dimension as X, such that
(4.53) plim
^ Z Z N
v n  J
is a finite matrix o f full rank, and
(4.54) p lim
is a finite matrix with rank (Z) = rank (X), and
(4.55) p lim
f r y '  \Z u
\  n  j
= Z z„ = » •
Equations (4.54) and (4.55) state that the variables in Z are correlated with the 
variables in X but are not correlated with the error term. In other words, we can think 
of Z as consisting o f the same variables as X, except that the endogenous variables 
have been replaced with their instruments, i.e., some other variable that is correlated
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with the endogenous variable but it is uncorrelated with the error term. 
Premultiplying y  = X/3 + u by Z yields
(4.56) Z y  = Z  X/3 + Z u .
It is easy to prove that
(4.57) Var(z'u)=a2(z'z).
This suggests the use o f Generalized Least Squares and the GLS of /? in equation
(4.56) is given by9
(4.58) bOLS = b lv = ( x z ( z 'z ) " 'z '^ ) ~ V z ( z 'z ) ' 'Z y .
We can prove that this estimator, blv , is consistent.10
The instrumental variables estimator in equation (4.58) is equivalent to the Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimator as the following explanation shows.
Let’s define P7 = z(z z) Z as a “projection matrix”, which is symmetric and 
idempotent. Then
(4.59) PZX  = z(z'z)'' Z '^  = Z b x7 = X ,
where bx. is the OLS estimator that arises when X  is regressed on Z , and X  is the 
predicted value of X given Z. Then, equation (4.58) can be written as
(4.60) baLS =b„,  = { x ’P7X y x ' P 2y  = { x x ) ' x ' y  = bls,s .
9 Proof, see Appendix A-6
10 Proof, see Appendix A-7
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It is obvious that this generalization of instrumental variables (IV) estimation is 
equivalent to the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) estimation. By comparing (4.58) 
and (4.60) the Covariance matrix for b2SJS is estimated by
(4.61) Var{b2SLS) = a 2 [.X ’z(z 'z )~ '  Z ' X j=  a 2[ x 'X  .
Although our analysis have been described in terms of matrix Z having the same 
dimension as X , it is still valid for model where Z has more columns than X , such 
that rank (Z) > rank (X).
Clearly b2SLS represents a special case o f GLS. The 2SLS estimator in equation
(4.57) uses the transformed variables, which have been purified from the problem of 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. Hence, the use of 
OLS on the equation that uses the transformed variables necessarily produces the 
minimum variance linear unbiased estimator of f t . It is more efficient, and it leads to 
correct standard errors, confidence intervals, and statistical tests.
To summarize, the four main steps in the 2SLS or instrumental variables 
estimation are as follows:
Consider the general model y  = x p  + u with Var(u) = a 2l .
Step One: Regress all the endogenous variables in the equation o f interest on all 
exogenous variables included in the equation plus any instruments that do not appear 
in the equation. Replace all the endogenous variables with their fitted values and let 
this new matrix be called X .
Step Two: Calculate the 2SLS estimator of /?, b2SIS = { x  X ) '  X  y .
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Step Three: Use b2SLS from the second step to calculate the residuals, 
e = y - X  b2SLS. Since b2SLS in the second step is a consistent estimator, as we have 
previously proved (see appendix 7), the estimator o f the residual is also consistent.11 
We use these residuals to estimate a 2 , p , and finally the V matrix.
Step Four: we could estimate b2SLS = { x  x )  X  y ,  and then use the covariance
matrix Cov(blsls) = [ x  x )  [ x  VX j x  x )  to estimate panel corrected standard 
errors if the error terms exhibit the “Parks” model, with the covariance V matrix 
expressed in equations (4.35) and (4.36). Alternatively, if the error terms exhibit 
common first order autocorrelation, we could calculate the 2SLS estimator and
associated covariance matrix as b2SLS = (x 'V ~ 'x ) ' X  V~'y,  and
Var(b2SLS) = ( x  V~'x)  , with the Covariance V~' matrix expressed in equations 
(4.15) and (4.16), respectively.
IV.14. Estimation Procedure of Analysts’ Forecasts Revision Model in Relation 
to the Filing of Antidumping Petitions and the Verdicts of the 
Investigation
We implement all the six specification tests that we discussed previously in our 
regression models. These tests incorporate the fixed effect test; the error structure test 
of autocorrelation, of panel heteroscedasticity, and of cross-sectional correlation; the
11 Note: In this case we estimate the consistent residual estim ator using e =  y  — Xb2SLS instead o f  
e = y  — Xb2SiS, because the original regression equation is y  = X/3 + £ . Rem em ber that in the
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
endogeneity test, and the Hausman test of whether to use fixed effects or random 
effects.
Reconsider equation (3.2) as follows:
3
AFrevl = j A F r e v ' l + a {Losslt + a 2UEjt + a 3Loss * UElt
7=1
(4-62) +'Z,S t Du  + M ( f ) + \ „ { l ) + s „
k =I
where M ( /)  is firm effects with/ =  1 ,... , 56 and A „,(/) is monthly time effects with 
t = 84:07, 84 :08 ,...................., 89:05, 89:06. Both M (/)  and Am (/) are fixed effects.
Let the model o f equation (4.62) be expressed in a general form as y  = X p  + s  
with s  ~ N ( 0 ,V ) .  Based on the test as explained in section IV.3, let’s assume that 
group effects do matter in our regression model. Therefore, we incorporate both firm 
effects M ( /)  and time effects Am(t) into our estimation. Also, based on the test as
explained in section IV.4, section IV.5, and section IV.6, let’s assume that the error 
structure is characterized by groupwise heteroscedasticity, common first order 
autocorrelation, and cross-sectional correlation.12
As discussed previously, there are a number o f econometric problems that must 
be addressed in order to obtain consistent estimates of the impact o f the filing of an 
AD petition and the verdicts of the investigation on the analysts’ forecast revisions.
Feasible GLS that we have discussed previously, we estimate the residual e  to calculate the parameter 
o f  V matrix.
12 W e also conduct estim ation with the assumption o f  com mon first order autocorrelation only in 
constructing the variance covariance matrix V. The results o f  the error structure tests explained in 
section IV.4, section IV.5, and section IV.6 will determine which underlying assumption o f  the error 
structure that is m ost appropriate in constructing our variance covariance matrix V. It influences the 
resulting analysis o f  the impact o f the filing o f  antidum ping petitions and the verdicts o f  the
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First, the presence of both group effects and lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables may introduce bias. Second, if  the error term is autocorrelated, 
the inclusion of lagged dependent variables provides an additional source of bias. The 
following procedure will produce consistent coefficient estimates.
Step One: Regress AF'r'cv on all the exogenous variables in equation (4.62) plus the set 
of instruments as tabulated in Table IV. 1:
























LOSS LOSS_l L O SS 2 LOSS_3 LOSS_4 FIRM
UE UE_1 UE_2 UE_3 UE_4 TIME
LOSSUE LOSSUE_l LOSSUE_2 LO SSU EJ LOSSUE_4
D1 D l_ l Dl_2 Dl_3 Dl_4
D2 D2_l D2_2 D2_3 D2_4
D3 D3_l D3_2 D3_3 D3_4
D4 D4_l D4_2 D4_3 D4_4
D5 D5_l D5_2 D5_3 D5_4
D6 D6_l D6_2 D6_3 D6_4
D7 D7_l D7_2 D7_3 D7_4
investigation on analysts’ forecast revisions. This will be discussed thoroughly in chapter VI, section 
VI.2.3
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Step Two: Create the predicted value of AFrhuv using the estimates from step One. 
Call this predicted value AFrhevh a t .
Step Three: Lag AF''cvhat three times and call the new variables A F ‘lvh a t _ \ ,  
AF'lJiat _ 2 ,  and A F ^ h a t_ 3 .
3
Step Four: Replace the explanatory variables 'Yj y JAFrev,’t_] in equation (4.62) with
y=i
3
their predicted values ' ^ y j AFrev'‘l_Jhat using A F ‘’evh a t_  1 ,AF'‘cvha(_ 2  and
7=1
AF''evhat _ 3 , and let the new matrix o f the explanatory variables be called X  from
(4.59).
Step Five: Calculate the 2SLS estimator o f/? , y8  = ( x x ) '  X y . We call this 
estimator a 2SLS estimator.
Step Six: Use /? from step Five to calculate the residuals e = y - X f i .
Step Seven: Use these residuals to estimate the inverse of the variance covariance
* 1 A matrix V~ and to estimate the variance covariance matrix V . The details of the
procedure are the following:
Step Seven-A: Use the residuals from step Six to calculate common
autocorrelation parameter ( p ) as given in equation (4.23).
Step Seven-B: Construct the transformation matrix P* as expressed in equation
(4.24), where the transformation matrix for each group (firm), P*, i =  1, . . . ,  N is 
given by equation (4.25).
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Step Seven-C: Transform the original equation (4.11 ) , y  = Xf3 + s , by 
premultiplying it by P'  that we obtained from Step Seven-B. This transformed 
equation is P ’y  = P' Xf3 + P ' s  or y  = X ‘ f t  + s '  where y ' = P ' y , X ' = P ' X , 
and s '  = P ' s .
Step Seven-D: Estimate, using OLS, P ' y  = P'XJ3 + P ' s  and obtain the 
residuals13.
Step Seven-E: Use these residuals to estimate as given in equation (4.28).
Step Seven-F: Use p that we obtained from Step Seven-A and cr] that we got
from Step Seven-E to estimate (cr^Oi.J and V ~l , as expressed in equation (4.14)
and (4.15) or to estimate V as given in equation (4.14).
Step Eight: as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) that we discussed previously, we 
can use the 2SLS estimator from Step Five14. Then, Use the covariance matrix
Cov[p)=  { x ' x ) ' { x v x j x x ) ' to estimate “Panel Corrected” standard errors if  the 
error structure exhibits autocorrelation, panels heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional 
correlation with the covariance matrix V as in equation (4.35) and (4.36). We call this 
estimator a 2SLS estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors.
IV.15. Estimation Procedure of the Absolute and Actual Forecast Errors Model 
in Relation to the Learning of the Filing of Antidumping Petitions
13 As we have explained previously in Section IV.2 that the invocation o f  OLS to this transformed 
equation produces BLUE estimators.
14 As we have shown previously the 2SLS estimation in Step Five provides a consistent estimator.
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We implement the same procedure as we do in the regression of the analysts’ 
earnings forecasts revision model. First, we do the test of the significance o f the fixed 
effects. Second, we test our belief about the error structure. Then, using the Hausman 
test, we verify whether fixed effects or random effects are most appropriate to our 
model. Based on these tests, then we invoke the appropriate estimation technique.
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This chapter provides the explanation of the data sources. Section V.2 describes 
the sources of the data. Section V.3 lays out the descriptive statistics of the data used 
to examine the analysts’ forecasts revision model. Section V.4 displays the 
descriptive statistics of the data used to examine the analysts’ forecast errors model.
V.2. Data Sources
We develop a panel data set of U.S. firms that filed petitions between 1985 and 
1987.15 This period was selected for several reasons. First, there were major 
institutional and procedural revisions in how AD petitions were treated in the U.S. in 
both 1979 and 1984, making the success of AD petitions by U.S. firms more likely. In 
particular, the 1984 Trade Act allows for the cumulation of allegedly unfair imports 
over petitions against multiple countries in the assessment of material injury. The 
number of AD cases investigated increased substantially subsequent to the 1984 
change. In 1985, 69 AD cases were initiated compared with only 38 in 1984. The 
number increased to 83 in 1986. Second, 1987 is included to allow control for the 
overall effects of market conditions since there was a downturn in the market in that 
year. Otherwise, it would be difficult to separate general market effects from the 
effects o f the changes in the dumping law. Furthermore, there was another major 
trade act passed in 1988. Finally, the inclusion of more years or petitions allows for
15 This data was obtained from Hartigan and Rogers (2003).
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more firm-specific complications such as mergers and acquisition. As such, we limit 
our panel by incorporating only petitions that were filed between 1985 and 1987.
Table C.l in Appendix C presents the original U.S. firms that participated in filing 
AD petitions, as were disclosed in U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 
material injury (section 731) investigations during 1985 through 1987. Table C.l also 
shows the dates o f the verdicts for each petition. The table excludes AD petitions for 
which investigative reports were not available. The investigation report might not be 
available even though a petition had been filed. A petition might reach a settlement 
before the investigation began or before the first decision, or it might fail the 
sufficiency test. As such, there would be no report available concerning the relevant 
firms involved in that petition. Table C.l also rules out petitions involving integrated 
steel and agricultural products.
Table C.l excludes petitions involving integrated steel producers because of two 
reasons. First, we did not want our sample to be dominated by a single industry since 
40 percent o f U.S. AD petitions are attributed to firms producing prefabricated steel 
products. Second, several steel investigations may be in process at any point in time. 
This may complicate the analysis since it makes it difficult (if not impossible) to 
separate out the effects of the timing of AD petitions. Table C.l also excludes 
petitions involving agricultural products because o f the differences in the rules 
regarding material injury imposed by the USITC and unfair pricing imposed by the 
Department o f Commerce. For example, decisions are required concerning whether 
both processors and growers should be included. Further, sales o f products at a loss 
are handled differently (Hartigan 2000).
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As was noted previously, Table C .l contains U.S. firms that filed petitions as 
were disclosed in the USITC investigative report during 1985 through 1987. 
Unfortunately, not all o f firms listed in Table C.l have publicly traded shares in the 
stock market. As such, we rule out firms that did not have publicly traded shares16. 
Then, we consulted the relevant 1980s issues o f Ward’s Business Directory and 
Security Owners Stock Guide to obtain a sample o f firms with publicly traded shares. 
We eliminated firms that went public or private during the period of our investigation. 
It is possible that firms listed in the original report o f Table C.l did not have publicly 
traded shares but instead were subsidiaries of a parent company. In the case that the 
parent company is a U.S. domestic company and has publicly traded shares, then we 
use the parent company as a substitute for the original firm in our sample. In a 
situation where the parent company is a foreign company, we excluded it from our 
sample.
In addition to excluding private and foreign concerns, we eliminated firms with 
multiple AD petitions filed within 280 days of each other or filed against additional 
countries while the investigation of its previous petition was still in process. This is to 
satisfy that the observations are independent in our estimation. We also eliminated 
pertinent firms involved in mergers and acquisitions during the sample period, since 
this complicates our analysis. Finally, firms with less than three years o f analysts’ 
forecasts data or lack of analysts’ forecasts data during the investigation period of its 
petition were also eliminated. This may be due to brokerages not covering or ceasing 
to cover or beginning coverage in midst o f our sample period. Table C.2 in Appendix
16 This is also the reason why w e exclude petitions involving agricultural products in our original 
sam ple o f  Table C .l since in any case, most agricultural concerns are not publicly traded in the stock
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C identifies the 27 AD petitions and the 56 publicly owned firms in industries 
pertinent to the petitions included in the sample for the purpose o f estimation.
Analysts’ forecasts data for several horizons, actual earnings per share both 
yearly and quarterly, and number of analysts are taken from the 1999 I/B/E/S 
(Institute Brokerage Estimate System) Summary Estimate CDs. If we found missing 
analysts forecast data in our firm month observation, then we invoke a zero revision 
for that observation. This is to keep our panel balanced. Price data and market 
capitalization data are taken from the CRSP (Center for Research and Security Price, 
The University of Chicago). The analysts’ forecast data in I/B/E/S has been adjusted 
for stock splits all the way back to the original year in the CDs. Accordingly, we 
chose the adjusted price in CRSP to make it comparable to the analysts’ forecast 
revision. Financial leverage data is obtained from the Compustat (Research Insight) 
CD-ROM. We identify the dates of quarterly earnings announcements for each 
pertinent firm in our sample using the LEXIS-NEXIS database and searching for 
variations o f the letters “earn.” From this searching, we also obtained the information 
about firms’ mergers and acquisitions.
In constructing the panel o f analysts’ forecast revisions, we utilized monthly data. 
To increase the power o f our test, our panel starts from July 1984 and concludes in 
June 1989. This is taking into account that the first petition in our sample happened in 
January 1985, and the verdict of the USITC final decision for the last petition in our 
sample happened in August 1988. Thus, we have 60-time series observations and 56 
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In contrast to the panel o f analysts’ forecast revisions, we assembled yearly data 
in creating the panel of analysts’ forecast errors. We do this because we used annual 
earnings and filing petition data for testing the analysts’ forecast errors. As mentioned 
previously, firms that filed petitions during the period o f 1985 to 1987 constructed 
our sample. As such, we set the panel o f analysts’ forecast errors from 1984 up to 
1989. This is done by including analysts’ forecast errors at least for one year period 
before filing a petition and analysts’ forecast errors one and for at most two year 
periods after filing a petition. By incorporating non-filing observations one-year 
period before the filing date, we increase the likelihood of discovering the possibility 
that analysts learn of a petition before it is filed. This takes into account the fact that a 
firm may communicate to the market through analysts to avoid liability issues. The 
inclusion of non-filing observations one- and two-year periods after the filing date 
takes into account other information that becomes available to the market. Moreover, 
a one year period after a filing date is used to capture the effect o f process filers of a 
petition to the analysts’ forecast errors, while two year periods after the filing date is 
included to apprehend the effect o f the outcome filers of a petition to the analysts’ 
forecast errors. As such, we will have six years of time series observations and 56 
firms leading to 336 observations that constructed the panel o f analysts’ forecast 
errors.
V.3. Data Used to Examine Analysts’ Forecasts Revision Model
Table V .l displays descriptive statistics for the sample o f monthly data used to 
examine analysts’ earnings forecast revision. The table shows that the analysts’
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earnings forecast revision of the next period earnings ( AF ''~X) is negative, on average
(0.0053). For our sample of firm-month observations, we found that 51.76% of the 
one year ahead earnings forecast changes were downward revisions, 16.10% had no 
change in the forecast, and 32.14% were upward revisions. For the second year ahead 
earnings forecast (AF*=2), 43.93% of the forecast were downward revisions, 27.71% 
had no change in the forecast, and 28.36% of the forecast were upward revisions. For 
the forecast o f five year long term earning growth ( AF/ f 5), 38.84% of the forecast
were downward revisions, 30.42% of the forecast had no change, and 30.74% of the 
forecast were upward revisions.17' 18
l7We have lack o f  availability o f  the third year ahead analysts’ earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S 
CDs, especially during the period o f  an antidumping petition investigation. As such, we do not 
incorporate the third year ahead earnings forecasts into our estimation. Similarly, we face data 
unavailability for the forecast horizons o f  more than three years ahead earnings, since analysts 
typically do not make a forecast for more than three years horizons.
18 Part o f  the report o f  no change in the forecasts contains m issing firm -m onth observations o f  
analysts’ forecast revisions for which we invoke as a zero revision. The first year ahead earnings 
forecast contains 20 firm-month missing observations out o f  3360 firm-month observations, which is 
0.60% . The second year ahead earnings forecasts contains 566 firm-month m issing observation out o f  
3360 form-month observations, which is 16.84%. The five year (long term) earnings growth forecast 
contains 249 firm -m onth missing observation out o f  3360 firm-month observations, which is 7.41%.
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Table V .l Descriptive Statistics (Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Revisions)
Monthly observations (NT=3360 firm-month observations, N=56 firms, T=60 
months)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
A F h=l
-0.0053 0.0238 -0.5143 0.1474
A F h=1 -0.0033 0.0207 -0.2618 0.4889
A F h=i rL1 /,/ -0.0050 0.2934 -3.3185 6.0245
Loss,, 0.0527 0.2234 0 1
UE„ -0 .0 2 2 1 0.4516 - 1 1 .8 8 10.39
Loss*UE„ -0.0355 0.3543 - 1 1 .8 8 1.94
Dl„ 0.0196 0.1388 0 1
D2„ 0 .0 0 1 2 0.0345 0 1
D3„ 0.0190 0.1367 0 1
D4„ 0.0190 0.1367 0 1
D5„ 0.0167 0.1280 0 1
D6 „ 0.0015 0.0385 0 1
D7„ 0.0152 0.1223 0 1
The description of the variables in Table V .l:
AF'f' : the revision in the mean forecasts for horizon equal to one year ahead 
earnings for firm i in month t deflated by beginning month t price.
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AFf'~2 : the revision in the mean forecasts for horizon equal to two year ahead
earnings for firm i in month t deflated by beginning month t price.
A F ff5 : the revision in the mean forecasts for five year long term earnings growth
for firm i in month t deflated by beginning month t price.
Loss;, : 1 if in month t the quarterly net income of firm i is reported to be less than 
zero, 0  otherwise.
UE„ : Unexpected earnings for firm i in month t.
D l„ : 1 if petition involving firm i was filed in month t, 0 otherwise.
D2„ : 1 if USITC Preliminary decision regarding firm i occurs in month t is
NEGATIVE, 0 otherwise.
D3„ : 1 if USITC Preliminary decision regarding firm i occurs in month t is
AFFIRMATIVE, 0 otherwise.
D4„ : 1 if DoC Preliminary decision regarding firm i petition occurs in month t,
0  otherwise.
D5„ : 1 if  DoC Preliminary decision regarding firm i petition occurs in month t,
0  otherwise.
D6 „ : 1 if  USITC Final decision regarding firm i that occurs in month t is
NEGATIVE, 0 otherwise.
D7„ : 1 if USITC Final decision regarding firm i that occurs in month t is 
AFFIRMATIVE, 0 otherwise.
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V.4. Data Used to Examine Analysts’ Forecasts Errors Model
Table V.2 shows the sample of annual data used to examine analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors. The mean analysts’ earnings forecast errors, both in the year before 
and after filing of AD petitions ( AFerri n[ and AFerrlJt_x, respectively), are negative
(-0.0096 and -0.0105, respectively). An average o f 19.64% of the firm-year 
observations includes the filing of AD petitions.
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Table V.2 Descriptive Statistics (Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors)
Annual observations (NT=336 firm-year observations, N=56 firms, T= 6  years)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
AFerr,,+l -0.0096 0.0537 -0.3387 0.3968
AFerr,t_x -0.0168 0.5960 -0.3423 0.3968
Filing/, 0.1964 0.3979 0 1
NA /,,+7 15.7857 9.7277 1 50
p  M  JK- i,t+l 0.1624 0.1288 -0.1642 0.3719
mcap,, 3.4053 6.1460 0.0126 40.4071
finlev,, 2.2694 1.7396 -6.6550 15.1140
The description o f the variables in Table V.2:
AFerrjl+i : The analysts’ forecast error for firm i for year t+1, the year after filing of
an AD petition, deflated by beginning of period price.
AFerrj t_x : The analysts’ forecast error for firm i for year t-1, the year before filing of
an AD petition, deflated by beginning of period price.
: 1 if  petition involving firm i was filed in year t, 0  otherwise.
: the number o f analysts forecasting one year ahead earnings for a given 
firm i in year t+ 1 .
: market return from the beginning to the end of period t+1 
: the market capitalization for firm i at the beginning o f year t, measured 
in billion U.S. dollars.
: the financial leverage for firm i at the beginning of year t.
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Filing/,
N A / , + /
p M  






This chapter provides the results o f the empirical estimations. Estimations are 
conducted using both SAS proc/IML and STATA. Section VI.2 reports the results of 
the analysts’ forecast revisions regression equation (3.2). Section VI.3 presents the 
results of the analysts’ forecast errors regression equation (3.4), which uses the 
absolute value o f the forecast error as a measure o f the forecast accuracy. Section 
VI.4 lays out the results of the analysts’ forecast errors regression equation (3.5), 
which uses the actual value o f the forecast error as a measure of the bias direction of 
the forecast. For each section, we present, discuss and analyze the results of the 
specification tests, which further leads to the appropriate estimation techniques, and 
the estimation results. We also report, for each section, the alternate specification to 
check the robustness of the estimation results. Finally, a summary concludes each 
section.
VI.2. The Result of the Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Revision Model in Relation 
to the Filing of Antidumping Petitions and the Verdicts of the 
Investigation
VI.2.1. Specification Tests
As usual, when we are dealing with Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) data, we 
need to check whether the intercepts are the same across the firms. If this is the case,
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we can do a pooling regression. Under the pooling regression, Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) provides consistent and efficient estimators. However, we need to test whether 
the heterogeneity of analysts’ forecast revisions matters across individual firms. 
Another question is whether the error structure is generated in an uncomplicated 
(spherical) manner. If it is not, then OLS is not optimal in the sense that there will be 
other estimators that make more efficient use o f the data. Furthermore, if  there is an 
endogeneity problem in our regression model, OLS will provide not only biased 
estimates but also inconsistent ones. Finally, we conduct the Hausman test for 
whether fixed effects or random effects are most appropriate to our model. For these 
reasons, we conduct several specification tests as explained in chapter IV.3 through 
IV.8 . The results of these specification tests will lead to the appropriate technique of 
estimation.
Table VI.l.a, Table Vl.l.b, and Table VI.l.c display the results of the 
specification tests on the regression equation (3.2) model o f analysts’ earnings 
forecasts revisions for the forecast horizons of one year ahead earnings, two year 
ahead earnings, and five year long term earnings growth, respectively.
For the forecast horizon of one year ahead earnings (Table VI.l.a), we find that 
fixed effects exist in our model. An F test for no fixed effects is rejected at the 1% 
level with Fn4,3232= L79. We also check whether we have one-way fixed effects or 
two-way fixed effects. The former suggests that our specification is dependent only 
on the cross section to which the observation belongs; while the latter conveys that 
our specification depends on both the cross section and the time series to which the 
observation belongs. We find that we have two-way fixed effects in which the firm
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effect is significant at the 5% level with F55,3232=1-53, and the time effect is 
significant at the 1% level with Fs9j3232=2.27. We also have a positive first order 
autocorrelation, which is significant at the 1% level with the T-statistic=4.71. The test 
of the groupwise heteroscedasticity yields a o f 5464.04 with 55 degrees of 
freedom, which greatly exceeds the 5% critical value of 73.31. The result of the
N ( N - \ )cross-sectional correlation test is distributed as a x  with 1540 (which is —^ — -)
degrees o f freedom, which at 5794549.8 greatly exceeds the 1% critical value of 
1632.41. The test of the endogeneity that the lagged dependent variables are 
correlated with the error term yields an F statistic, which is significant at the 5% level 
(F3,3340=2.53). The Hausman test, which is distributed as a with 13 degrees of 
freedom, is significant at the 1% level, which at 74.33 greatly exceeds the critical 
value of 27.69. The hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
other regressors in the model is rejected. As a result of the previously mentioned F 
test for the presence o f fixed effects, and the Hausman test for the presence of 
correlation between the individual effects and the other regressors, we conclude that 
fixed effects are a more appropriate specification than random effects. The 
heterogeneity of the analysts’ forecast revisions across individual firms exist for the 
forecast horizon o f one year ahead earnings.
Table V l.l.b  presents the results of the specification tests o f the analysts’ 
earnings forecasts revisions for the forecast horizon of two year ahead earnings. We 
find the existence of fixed effects. An F test o f no fixed effects is rejected at the 1% 
level with Fi 14,3232=2.30. We also have a two-way fixed effect in which firm effects 
and time effects are significant at the 1% level with F55>3232=2.32 and F5 9 ,3232=2 .8 6 ,
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respectively. We also find a significant result o f the first order autocorrelation test in 
the error structure with the T-Statistics=5.41. The panel heteroscedasticity test, which 
is distributed as a x 2 with 1540 degrees o f freedom, is significant at the 1% level, 
which at a x 2 = 70109.5 greatly exceeds the critical value o f 1632.4. The F test of 
the endogeneity of lagged dependent variables is not significant at the 5% level with 
F3,3340- I  -74. The Hausman test, which is distributed as a j 2 with 13 degrees of 
freedom, is significant at the 1% level, which at 80.61 greatly exceeds the critical 
value o f 27.69.
For the forecast horizon of five year long term earnings growth, Table VI.l.c 
reports the results of the specification tests. An F test for no fixed effects is not 
significant at the 5% level with F] 14,3232—0.85. Both firm effects and time effects are 
not significant at 1% level with F55,3232=0 .5 8  and F59i3232=0.95, respectively. The test 
o f the first order autocorrelation test in the error structure yields a T-Statistics of 9.45, 
which is significant at the 1% level. The panel heteroscedasticity test, which is 
distributed as a x 2 with 55 degrees o f freedom, is significant at the 1% level, which 
at 6359.64 greatly exceeds the critical value of 73.31. The cross-sectional correlation 
test, which is distributed as a x 2 with 1540 degrees o f freedom, is significant at the 
1% level, which at 5696973 greatly exceeds the critical value of 1632.41. The 
endogeneity test o f lagged dependent variables yields a significant result at the 1% 
level with F 3 ,3 3 4 o = 7 . 4 4 .  The Hausman test of whether fixed effects or random effects 
are more appropriate, which is distributed as a x 2 with 13 degrees of freedom, is 
significant at the 5% level with Xn = 32.66, exceeding the critical value of 27.69.
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Based on the above specification tests results for each forecast horizon, we 
conclude that we do have fixed effects and endogeneity in our lagged dependent 
variables. This implies that a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with instruments is 
appropriate for our estimation. Moreover, the assumption that the error structures are 
generated in an uncomplicated (spherical) manner is strongly rejected. Instead, we 
have first order autocorrelation and panel correlation in the error structure. Following 
Beck and Katz (1995), we invoke the technique o f Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE). The results of 2SLS with PCSE are displayed in Table VI.2.
VI.2.2. Estimation Results
Table VI.2 presents the results o f estimating the analysts’ earnings forecast 
revision regression equation (3.2) with the forecast horizon h set equal to 1,2, and 5, 
where h=5 represents a five year average growth rate. The estimation technique 
involves 2SLS with PCSE.
The first column of Table VI.2 presents the effect of filing an AD petition and the 
verdicts of the investigation on one year ahead earnings forecast revisions. The 
coefficient on D2, which is the ITC preliminary negative decision, is negative and 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that analysts tend to revise their one year 
ahead earnings forecast downward, on average, upon learning the announcement of 
the negative ITC preliminary decision. This indicates that analysts believe any 
incremental information signaled by the negative ITC preliminary decision is more 
likely to lead to a decline in the first year earnings relative to their prior prediction. 
The coefficient of other dummy variables about the filing of AD petitions and the
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announcement o f the verdict o f the investigation are found to be not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Affirmative decisions may not be significant 
because the good news of that decision is counterbalanced by the bad news of injury, 
particularly since the petition may occur in the midst o f the year for which the 
forecast is given. The coefficients on lagged dependent variables are significant at the 
1% level, suggesting there is inertia in analysts’ forecast revisions. The coefficient on 
the dummy variable for LOSS is negative, as expected, suggesting that analysts tend 
to revise their one year ahead forecast downward in the presence of current period 
loss. This is consistent with Chaney et al (1999). The coefficient of Unexpected 
Earnings (UE) is positive, but it is not statistically different from zero. The coefficient 
on the interactive variable LOSS*UE is negative but again not statistically significant.
To examine analysts’ expectations for firm’s earnings two years after filing an 
AD petition, and the verdicts of the investigation, we next estimate regression 
equation (3.2) using 2SLS with PCSE specifying h=2 as the dependent variable, 
where h=2 is a two year ahead earnings forecast. The results are presented in the 
second column of Table VI.2. Here we find that the coefficient on the dummy 
variable D5, which is the Department of Commerce final decision, is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. This suggests that analysts tend to revise their second 
year earnings forecast upward, on average, upon learning of the announcement o f the 
Department o f Commerce final decision. This indicates that dumping exists, which 
means that the foreign firms (dumpers) are selling their products below their 
production cost or below their home market price in the U.S. market. Analysts tend to 
perceive that the petition may be granted to the pertinent firms and the duties and/or
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penalties might be imposed to the foreign dumpers. This benefit may appear after 280 
days o f the AD investigation time period since the filing date or may appear earlier, 
as foreign firms must post a bond in the amount o f the DoC preliminary decisions for 
each export. Analysts tend to perceive that this benefit will positively affect the firm’s 
second year earnings. Since the DoC finds in the affirmative 95 percent of time, the 
good news associated with the DoC final decision is the amount of the duty. We do 
not find any statistically significant coefficients on the other dummy variables about 
the filing of AD petitions and the verdicts o f the investigation. The coefficients on 
lagged dependent variables are statistically significant at the 1% level for the first and 
second lag and not statistically significant for the third lag. These suggest the 
existence o f inertia in analysts’ forecast revisions. The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for LOSS is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
suggests that analysts tend to revise their second year earnings forecasts downward in 
the presence of current period loss. The coefficient on Unexpected Earnings (UE) is 
not statistically significant. The coefficient on the interactive term LOSS*UE is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that analysts are 
cautious and pessimistic in their second year earnings forecast in the presence of a 
loss.
From the results o f these two forecast horizon revisions, we find that when the 
ITC preliminary decision is announced to be negative, analysts tend to revise their 
one year ahead earnings forecasts downward. Another finding is when the 
Department o f Commerce final decision concluded that the dumping margins exist, 
analysts tend to revise their second year ahead earnings forecast upward.
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However, when we replace the horizon in forecasted earnings with h=5, none of 
the coefficients on the dummies about the filing o f AD petitions and the 
announcement of the verdicts of the investigative decision are statistically significant. 
This suggests that any incremental information signaled by the filing o f AD petitions 
and the announcement of the verdicts o f the investigation has a short term effect, 
which is one and two years, on the value of the firm. The estimation results using the 
average five year earnings growth as the dependent variable are presented in the third 
column of Table VI.2.
In summary, the results o f Table VI.2 provide evidence that subsequent to ITC 
preliminary negative decision, analysts tend to revise their first year earnings forecast 
downward. Furthermore, analysts tend to revise their second year earnings forecast 
upward upon learning of the Department of Commerce final decision.
VI.2.3. Alternate Specifications
It might be the case that analysts anticipate the event o f the filing of AD petitions 
earlier by revising their forecasts several months before the date o f the actual filing of 
an AD petition, or before the date that the verdicts o f an investigation are announced. 
To explore this possibility, we construct dummy variables for the first, second, and 
third months prior to the file month, denoted dlleadl, dllead2, dllead3, 
respectively. 19
The results of the estimation show that analysts may anticipate their revision at 
one month, two months, or three months before a firm files an AD petition for the 
earnings forecast horizon of one year ahead earnings, two year ahead earnings, and
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five year average growth. These are presented in Table VI.3, Table VI.4, and Table 
VI.5, respectively.
Table VI.3 presents the results of the estimating regression equation (3.2) with 
the h set equal to 1. The first column displays our previous result, namely the effect of 
filing AD petitions and the announcement of the verdicts of the investigation on one 
year ahead earnings forecast revisions using D 1 as the dummy variable (it is merely 
the first column of Table VI.2). When we estimate regression equation (3.2) with 
D lleadl, Dllead2, and Dllead3 defined as dummy variables equal to one at the one 
month, two months, and three months before a firm files an AD petition, respectively, 
our results for the one year ahead forecast revisions are qualitatively unchanged. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable D2, which is the ITC preliminary negative 
decision, is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The significance of 
the other coefficients such as lagged dependent variables, LOSS variable, are similar 
to our main result (the first column). The coefficients on other dummy variables D2 
through D7 about the announcement of the verdicts o f the investigation are not 
statistically different from zero. This is consistent with our main result. We do not 
find evidence to support the hypothesis that analysts may anticipate their first year 
forecast revisions several months before a firm files an AD petition. These results are 
presented in the second, third, and fourth column of Table VI.3.
We next estimate regression equation (3.2) specifying h=2 as a two year ahead 
earnings forecast revision with D lleadl, Dllead2, and Dllead3 defined as before. 
The results are presented in the second, third, and fourth column of Table VI.4, 
respectively. The first column displays our previous result, namely the effect of filing
19 Activity in lead periods was investigated in other research. See Hartigan and Rogers (2003).
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AD petitions and the announcement of the verdicts of the investigation on two year 
ahead earnings forecast revisions using D1 as the dummy variable (it is merely the 
second column of Table VI.2). Table VI.4 shows that our results are qualitatively 
unchanged for the two year ahead earnings forecast revisions. The coefficient on the 
dummy variable D5, which is the Department o f Commerce final decision, is positive 
and significant at the 10% level. The significance of the other coefficients such as 
lagged dependent variables, LOSS variable, and LOSS*UE variable are similar to our 
main result (the first column). The coefficients on other dummy variables D2 through 
D7 about the announcement of the verdicts of the investigative decisions are not 
statistically different from zero. This is consistent with our main result displayed in 
the first column. The new interesting findings are that the coefficient on the dummy 
variable Dllead3 is positive and significant at the 1% level, and the coefficient on the 
dummy variable D lleadl is negative and significant at the 1% level. These findings 
may be interpreted as follows. It appears that the prospect of filing an AD petition 
seems to be causing a reaction on the part o f analysts. Since there are both an 
upwards and a downwards revision that are statistically significant, it appears to be 
difficult for analysts to ascertain the effect o f the petition on earnings subsequent to 
the petition. The early optimism may be somewhat tempered by subsequent 
reassessment. Later, when the firm submits the petition and the Department of 
Commerce announces the final decision, analysts become more optimistic on their 
second year earnings forecasts. This is shown by a positive significant coefficient on 
the D5 variable, which is the Department of Commerce Final Decision.
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However, when we replace the horizon in forecast earnings with h=5, with 
D llead l, Dllead2, and Dllead3 defined as before, our results for five year long term 
earnings growth are qualitatively unchanged. Table VI.5 presents the results. None of 
the coefficients on the verdicts o f the investigation are statistically significant. 
However, the coefficient on Dllead2 is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
This suggests that analysts tend to revise their five year long term earnings growth 
forecasts downward in the two months prior to the file month.
Another way to check the robustness o f our results is by relaxing the panel 
correlation assumption in the error structure. Remember that all the exogenous 
explanatory variables in regression equation (3.2) are dummy variables except the UE 
(unexpected earnings) variable, which is a continuous variable. Let’s assume that the 
error structure exhibits first order autocorrelation only, without panel correlation. We 
repeat the estimation regression equation (3.2) using 2SLS with Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS). We set the dummy variables D l, D lleadl, Dllead2, and 
Dllead3 defined as before, and do the estimation by setting h= l, 2, and 5, where h=l, 
2, and 5 are a one year ahead earnings forecast, a two year ahead earnings forecast, 
and a five year average earnings growth, respectively. Table VI.6  presents the 
estimation results for the one year ahead earnings forecasts revision; Table VI.7 
displays the estimation results for the two year ahead earnings forecasts revision; and 
Table VI.8 discloses the results for the five year long term earnings growth.
The results o f 2SLS using FGLS estimation in these three tables reveal that the 
standard error o f the coefficient estimates are smaller compared to the corresponding 
coefficient standard error using 2SLS with PCSE. This is as expected, and it does not
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change the significance of the coefficients that we obtained using 2SLS with PCSE, 
except for the coefficient on the variable UE (Unexpected Earnings). Using 2SLS 
with FGLS estimation, we find that the coefficient on the UE variable is positive and 
significant for one year ahead earnings forecast revisions (Table VI.6 ) .20 This is as we 
expected. If analysts perceive that the unexpected earnings will persist into the future, 
the coefficient on the variable UE will be positive. The coefficient on the dummy 
variable D2, which is the ITC preliminary negative decision, is negative and 
significant at the 10% level for one year ahead earnings forecast revisions. This is 
consistent with our findings using 2SLS with PCSE. Moreover, from Table VI.7, we 
see that the coefficient on the dummy variable D5, which is the Department of 
Commerce final decision, is positive and significant at the 5% level for two year 
ahead earnings forecast revision. This is also consistent with our findings using 2SLS 
with PCSE. Another finding, the coefficient on the dummy variable D2, which is the 
ITC preliminary negative decision, is positive and significant at the 5% level for the 
two year ahead earnings forecast revisions.21
However, Table VI.8  reveals that none of the coefficients on the dummy 
variables about the filing of AD petitions and the announcement o f the verdicts of the 
investigation affects analysts’ expectations on a five year long term earnings growth 
revision. This is consistent with our findings using 2SLS with PCSE. The interesting 
finding, though, that the coefficient on Dllead2 is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, suggests that at two months before a firm files an AD petition, analysts
20 Using 2SLS with PCSE, we found that the coefficient on the variable UE is positive but not 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels (Table VI.2, column 1)
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anticipate the earlier information by revising the five year long term earnings growth 
downward.
The lack o f statistical significance in the five year long term earnings growth 
estimation may reflect several factors. One is that long term projections are inherently 
difficult to make. Another is that the AD duties may or may not remain in effect that 
long. Further, analysts may be pessimistic about the ability of firms to withstand 
foreign competition, even in the presence o f protection.
Although the results of the 2SLS with FGLS estimation are promising, overall 
these results are rejected since we do have panel correlation in the error structure.
Another robustness check is performed by increasing the number o f lagged 
dependent variables in the explanatory variables in regression equation (3.2). Table 
VI.9 shows the results o f 2SLS with PCSE estimation if we increase the lag of the 
dependent variable to 12 months (one year). The results o f Table VI.9 are consistent 
with our previous findings that upon learning of the negative ITC preliminary 
decision, analysts tend to revise their first year earnings forecast downward. 
Moreover, analysts tend to revise their second year earnings forecast upward upon 
learning of the Department o f Commerce final decision. We should note that we do 
not increase the number of lagged dependent variables more than 12  months, since 
the actual annual earnings have been announced anyway. Besides, there is a trade-off
21 Using 2SLS with PCSE, we found that the coefficient on the variable D2, which is the ITC 
preliminary negative decision, is positive but not significantly different from zero at conventional
levels for the two year ahead earnings forecast revisions (the second column o f  Table VI.2)
22
The 2 SLS with FGLS gives the positive significant coefficient on the control variable, such as, the 
UE variable, for the forecast horizon o f  one year ahead earnings. In addition, it yields the negative 
significant coefficient on the variable D l Iead2 for the forecast horizon o f  five year long term earnings 
growth revisions. Moreover, it gives the positive significant coefficient on the ITC preliminary 
negative decision for two year ahead earnings forecasts revisions.
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between increasing the lags o f the dependent variables in the explanatory variables 
with the efficient use o f the data.
VI.2.4. Conclusion
In summary, the results presented in Table VI.2 appear to be robust to alternative 
specifications controlling for the possibility that analysts may anticipate their forecast 
revisions earlier than the AD filing date. We investigate it for one, two, and three 
months before the filing date. The results o f Table VI.2 also tend to be robust to 
alternative specifications controlling for the different assumptions o f the error 
structure and different techniques o f the estimation. Finally, our results seem to be 
robust to the number of lags o f the dependent variables that should be included in the 
explanatory variables.
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Table V l.l.a  
SPECIFICATION TESTS ON 
ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.2) 
With h set equal to One Year Ahead Earnings Forecasts
Specification Tests Results Remarks
Fixed Effect Test:
F Test for no fixed effect 
Firm Effect 
Time Effect
F 114,3232 = 1-79 
F55,3232 = 1-53 
F59,3232 = 2.27
See Chapter IV.3 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001 
Pr > F is equal to 0.0076 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001
Autocorrelation Test Coefficient on et.i = 0.2780 
with the Std. Err = 0.0566 
and T-Statistics = 4.71
See Chapter IV.4 
Ho: There is no first order 





X l ^ s  =5464.04 
x l  =73.31 at 5% level
See Chapter IV.5 




Correlation Test = 5 7 9 4 5 4 9 -82
x l  = 1632.4 at 5% level
See Chapter IV .6  
Ho: There is no cross- 




F Test v, = v 2 = v3 = 0 F33340= 2.53
See Chapter IV.7 
Pr > F is equal to 0.0554 
Ho: There is no correlation 
between lagged dependent 
variables with the error term 
Conclusion: Reject Ho
Hausman Test 
For Random Effect Xn ~ 74.33 
X l  = 27.69 at 1% level
See Chapter IV .8 
Ho: The individual effects 
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Table V l.l.b  
SPECIFICATION TESTS ON 
ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.2) 
With h set equal to Two Year Ahead Earnings Forecasts
Specification Tests Results Remarks
Fixed Effect Test:
F Test for no fixed effect 
Firm Effect 
Time Effect
F 114,3232 = 2.31
F55,3232 = 2.32
F59,3232 = 2.86
See Chapter IV.3 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001
Autocorrelation Test Coefficient on e,.| = 0.1981 
with the Std. Err = 0.0366 
and T-Statistics = 5.41
See Chapter IV.4 
Ho: There is no first order 





Z U 55 =2772.42 
X l  =73.31 at 5% level
See Chapter IV.5 





x ; (nA) =4970109.5
K -1540 
2
x l  = 1632.4 at 5% level
See Chapter IV .6  
Ho: There is no cross- 




F Test v l = v 2 = v 3 = 0 F3.3340 = 1 -74
See Chapter IV.7 
Pr > F is equal to 0.1450 
Ho: There is no correlation 
between lagged dependent 
variables with the error term 
Conclusion: Do Not Reject 
Ho
Hausman Test 
For Random Effect Zi3 = 80.61
x l  = 27.69 at 1% level
See Chapter IV. 8 
Ho: The individual effects 
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Table VI.l.c 
SPECIFICATION TESTS ON 
ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.2) 
With h set equal to Five Year Long Term Earnings Growth
Specification Tests Results Remarks
Fixed Effect Test:
F Test for no fixed effect 
Firm Effect 
Time Effect
F 114,3232 = 0.85 
F55,3232 = 0.58 
F59,3232 = 0.95
See Chapter IV.3 
Pr > F is equal to 0.8640 
Pr > F is equal to 0.9950 
Pr > F is less than 0.5765
Autocorrelation Test Coefficient on et.i = 0.2210 
with the Std. Err = 0.0870 
and T-Statistics = 9.45
See Chapter IV.4 
Ho: There is no first order 





X l w  = 6359.63 
X l  =73.31 at 5% level
See Chapter IV.5 





x l  =1632.4 at 5% level
See Chapter IV .6  
Ho: There is no cross- 




F Test v, = v2 = = 0 F3,3340 = 7.44
See Chapter IV.7 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001
Hausman Test 
For Random Effect X l  =32.66 
x l  = 27.69 at 1% level
See Chapter IV .8 
Ho: The individual effects 
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Table VI.2
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES






FIVE YEAR (LONG 
TERM) EARNINGS 
GROWTH
AFREV_1 0.6645 *** 0.4352 *** 0.5991 ***
(0.1055) (0.1064) (0.2315)
[6.30] [4.09] [2.59]
AFREV_2 -0.2422 ** -0.3949 *** -0.3834
(0 .1 2 0 1 ) (0.1076) (0.2405)
[-2 .0 1 ] [-3.67] [-1.59]
AFREV_3 0.3144 *** 0.1378 0.2007
(0.1081) (0.0986) (0.2362)
[2.91] [1.40] [0.85]
LOSS -0 .0 1 1 2  *** -0.0159*** 0.0070
(0.0025) (0 .0 0 2 1 ) (0.0196)
[-4.34] [-7.55] [0.36]
UE 0 .0 0 2 1 -0.0017 0.0085
(0.0019) (0 .0 0 2 2 ) (0.0104)
[1.08] [-0.78] [0.82]
LOSS*UE
- 0.0000 -0.0157 *** -0.0046
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0146)
[-0 .0 2 ] [-4.94] [-0.31]
D l 0.0031 0.0013 0.0187
(0.0023) (0 .0 0 2 2 ) (0.0330)
[1.32] [0.60] [0.57]
ITC-Prelim -0.0182 * 0.0193 0.0064
NEGATIVE (0 .0 1 0 2 ) (0.0146) (0.3443)
[-1.78] [1.32] [0 .0 1 ]
ITC-Prelim 0 .0 0 2 0 -0.0008 0.0231
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0024) (0 .0 0 2 2 ) (0.0272)
[0.84] [-0.37] [0.85]
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TABLE VI.2
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS
Continued
IN D E P E N D E N T
V A R IA B L E S
D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E  IS A N A L Y S T S ’ F O R E C A S T  R E V IS IO N S
EA RN IIN G S F O R E C A S T  H O R IZ O N S
O N E  Y E A R T W O  Y E A R
F IV E  Y E A R  (L O N G  
T E R M ) E A R N IN G S  
G R O W T H
DoC-Prelim 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0277
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0348)
[0.43] [-0.53] [0.79]
DoC-FINAL 0.0013 0.0044 * -0.0248
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0391)
[0.56] [1.92] [-0.63]
ITC-FINAL 0.0055 0.0076 0.0163
NEGATIVE (0.0107) (0.0086) (0.1001)
[0.52] [0.87] [0.16]
ITC-FINAL 0.0032 0.0005 0.0279
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0427)
[1.42] [0.23] [0.65]
O b se rv a tio n s 3192 3192 3192
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.3
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
IN D E P E N D E N T D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E  IS A N A L Y S T S ’ F O R E C A S T  R E V IS IO N S
V A R IA B L E S F O R E C A S T  H O R IZ O N  IS  ON E Y E A R  A H E A D  E A R N IN G S
AFREV1_1 0.6645 *** 0.6631 *** 0.6625 *** 0.6611 ***
(0.1055) (0.1055) (0.1054) (0.1052)
[6.30] [6.29] [6.28] [6.28]
AFREV1_2 -0.2422 ** -0.2435 ** -0.2428 ** -0.2431 **
(0.1201) (0.1201) (0.1198) (0.1197)
[-2.01] [-2.03] [-2.03] [-2.03]
AFREV1_3 0.3144 *** 0.3165 *** 0.3163 *** 0.3167 ***
(0.1081) (0.1080) (0.1080) (0.1078)
[2.91] [2.93] [2.93] [2.94]
LOSS -0.0112 *** -0.0112 *** - 0.0111 *** -0.0112 ***
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
[-4.34] [-4.35] [-4.34] [-4.36]
UE 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0020
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
[1.08] [1.08] [1.08] [1.08]
LOSS*UE
- 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0000
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
[-0.02] [-0.01] [-0.01] [-0.02]
D1LEAD3 N/A N/A N/A 0.0030
(0.0023)
[1.30]
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Table VI.3
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND




DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
FORECAST HORIZON IS ONE YEAR AHEAD EARNINGS
Dl 0.0031 0.0031 0.0030 0.0031
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
[1.32] [1.28] [1.26] [1.31]
ITC-Prelim -0.0182 * -0.0182* -0.0182 * -0.0183 *
NEGATIVE (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102)
[-1.78] [-1.78] [-1.78] [-1.80]
ITC-Prelim 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019 0.0020
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
[0.84 [0.81] [0.79] [0.83]
DoC-Prelim 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
[0.43] [0.39] [0.39] [0.43]
DoC-FINAL 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
[0.56] [0.53] [0.53] [0.56]
ITC-FINAL 0.0055 0.0054 0.0054 0.0054
NEGATIVE (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108)
[0.52] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
ITC-FINAL 0.0032 0.0032 0.0031 0.0030
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022)
[1.42] [1.40] [1.39] [1.34]
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.4
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
VARIABLES FORECAS1f HORIZON IS TWO YEAR AHEAD EARNINGS
A FR EV 2J 0.4352 *** 0.4223 *** 0.4309 *** 0.4344 ***
(0.1064) (0.1064) (0.1061) (0.1051)
[4.09] [4.06] [4.06] [4.13]
AFREV2J2 -0.3949 *** -0.3890 *** -0.3881 *** -0.3875 ***
(0.1076) (0.1071) (0.1070) (0.1062)
[-3.67] [-3.63] [-3.63] [-3.65]
AFREV2_3 0.1378 0.1338 0.1335 0.1342
(0.0986) (0.0985) (0.0985) (0.0976)
[1.40] [1.362] [1.36] [1.37]
LOSS -0.0159 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0161 ***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
[-7.55] [-7.57] [-7.59] [-7.69]
UE -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
[-0.78] [-0.77] [-0.77] [-0.79]
LOSS*UE -0.0157 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0154 ***
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031)
[-4.94] [-4.93] [-4.93] [-4.90]
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Table VI.4
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
Continued
IN D E P E N D E N T
V A R IA B L E S
D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E  IS A N A L Y S T S ’ F O R E C A S T  R E V IS IO N S
FO R E C A S1r H O R IZ O N  IS T W O  Y E A R  A H E A D EA R N IN G S
Dl 0.0013 0.0011 0.0012 0.0015
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
[0.60] [0.50] [0.53] [0.69]
ITC-Prelim 0.0193 0.0194 0.0195 0.0194
NEGATIVE (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0144)
[1.32] [1.32] [1.33] [1.35]
ITC-Prelim -0.0083 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0007
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
[-0.37] [-0.48] [-0.45] [-0.33]
DoC-Prelim -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0010
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
[-0.53] [-0.63] [-0.60] [-0.47]
DoC-FINAL 0.0044 * 0.0043 * 0.0043 * 0.0045 **
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
[1.92] [1.85] [1.88] [1.98]
ITC-FINAL 0.0076 0.0072 0.0073 0.0074
NEGATIVE (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087)
[0.87] [0.83] [0.84] [0.85]
ITC-FINAL 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024)
[0.23] [0.17] [0.18] [0.00]
O b serv a tio n s 3192 3192 3192 3192
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.5
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
VARIABLES FORECAST HORIZON IS FIVE YEAR LONG TERM  EARNINGS GROW TH
AFREV5_1 0.5991 *** 0.5967 *** 0.5932 ** 0.5912 ***
(0.2315) (0.2314) (0.2314) (0.2315)
[2.59] [2.58] [2.56] [2.55]
AFREV5_2 -0.3834 -0.3838 -0.3911 -0.3887
(0.2405) (0.2405) (0.2400) (0.2401)
[-1.59] [-1.59] [-1.63] [-1.62]
AFREV5_3 0.2007 0.1982 0.1990 0.1953
(0.2362) (0.2362) (0.2361) (0.2362)
[0.85] [0.84] [0.84] [0.83]
LOSS 0.0070 0.0067 0.0081 0.0084
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196)
[0.36] [0.34] [0.41] [0.43]
UE 0.0085 0.0085 0.0086 0.0086
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
[0.82] [0.82] [0.83] [0.83]
LOSS*UE -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0045
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147)
[-0.31] [-0.29] [-0.27] [-0.30]
D1LEAD3 N/A N/A N/A -0.0205
(0.0326)
[-0.63]
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Table VI.5
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND




DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
FORECAST HORIZON IS FIVE Y EAR LONGTERM  EARNINGS GROW TH
Dl 0.0187 0.0170 0.0134 0.0126
(0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0332)
[0.57] [0.51] [0.40] [0.38]
ITC-Prelim 0.0064 0.0064 0.0042 0.0045
NEGATIVE (0.3443) (0.3443) (0.3441) (0.3441)
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
ITC-Prelim 0.0231 0.0214 0.0177 0.0171
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0274)
[0.85] [0.78] [0.659] [0.62]
DoC-Prelim 0.0277 0.0263 0.0232 0.0225
(0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0347)
[0.79] [0.76] [0.67] [0.65]
DoC-FINAL -0.0248 -0.0261 -0.0288 -0.0294
(0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0390)
[-0.63] [-0.67] [-0.74] [-0.75]
ITC-FINAL 0.0163 0.0136 0.0103 0.0102
NEGATIVE (0.1001) (0.1003) (0.1011) (0.1005)
[0.16] [0.13] [0.10] [0.10]
ITC-FINAL 0.0279 0.0268 0.0258 0.0268
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0426) (0.0422)
[0.65] [0.63] [0.61] [0.64]
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192
Note; ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.6
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
VARIABLES FORECAS'r HORIZON IS ONE YEAR AHEAD EARNINGS
A FR EV 1J 0.6274 *** 0.6254 *** 0.6240 *** 0.6224 ***
(0.0664) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0665)
[9.43] [9.40] [9.38] [9.35]
AFREV1_2 -0.2244 *** -0.2256 *** -0.2244 *** -0.2248 ***
(0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0751)
[-2.98] [-3.00] [-2.99] [-2.99]
AFREV1_3 0.3198 *** 0.3219 *** 0.3218 *** 0.3223 ***
(0.0665) (0.0666) (0.0666) (0.0665)
[4.80] [4.84] [4.83] [4.84]
LOSS -0.0108 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0108 ***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
[-6.52] [-6.53] [-6.52] [-6.54]
UE 0.0022 ** 0.0023 ** 0.0023 ** 0.0023 **
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
[1.97] [1.98] [1.98] [1.98]
LOSS*UE -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
[-0.50] [-0.50] [-0.51] [-0.46]
D1LEAD3 N/A N/A N/A 0.0030
(0.0023)
[1.30]
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Table VI.6
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND




DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
FORECAST HORIZON IS ONE YEAR AHEAD EARNINGS
Dl 0.0033 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
[1.47] [1.37] [1.35] [1.40]
ITC-Prelim -0.0169* -0.0169 * -0.0169 * -0.0169 *
NEGATIVE (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)
[-1.84] [-1.84] [-1.84] [-1.84]
ITC-Prelim 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
[0.78] [0.75] [0.73] [0.76]
DoC-Prelim 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
[0.67] [0.65] [0.64] [0.68]
DoC-FINAL 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.00131
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026)
[0.50] [0.48] [0.47] [0.50]
ITC-FINAL 0.0058 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057
NEGATIVE (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081)
[0.71] [0.70] [0.70] [0.70]
ITC-FINAL 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0028
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
[1.13] [1.12] [1.12] [1.06]
Observations 3192 3360 3192 3192
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.7
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
IN D E P E N D E N T D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E  IS  A N A L Y S T S ’ F O R E C A S T  R E V IS IO N S
V A R IA B L E S FO R E C A S1r  H O R IZ O N  IS T W O  Y E A R  A H E A D 2A R N IN G S
A FR EV 2J 0.4282 *** 0.4247 *** 0.4237 *** 0.4273 ***
(0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0461)
[9.27] [9.20] [9.17] [9.27]
AFREV2_2 -0.3916 *** -0.3855 *** -0.3849 *** -0.3843 ***
(0.0463) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0463)
[-8.44] [-8.31] [-8.30] [-8.29]
AFREV2_3 0.1336 *** 0.1294 *** 0.1292 *** 0.1300 ***
(0.0474) (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0474)
[2.81] [2.73] [2.72] [2.75]
L O S S -0.0156 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0158 ***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
[-10.41] [-10.44] [-10.45] [-10.56]
U E -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
[-1.57] [-1.56] [-1.57] [-1.59]
L O S S * U E -0.0158 *** -0.0158 *** -0.0158 *** -0.0156 ***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
[-11.15] [-11.15] [-11.15] [-10.99]
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Table VI.7
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
Continued
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS





























































































Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.8
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE FILING, RESPECTIVELY.
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
VARIABLES FORECAST HORIZON IS FIVE YEAR LONG TERM  EARNINGS GROW TH
A FR EV 5J 0.5096 ** 0.5068 ** 0.4988 ** 0.4955 **
(0.2042) (0.2043) (0.2042) (0.2042)
[2.49] [2.48] [2.44] [2.43]
AFREV5_2 -0.3547 * -0.3547 * -0.3623 * -0.3595 *
(0.2077) (0.2077) (0.2075) (0.2074)
[-1.70] [-1.71] [-1.75] [-1.73]
AFREV5_3 0.2212 0.2190 0.2207 0.2157
(0.2022) (0.2023) (0.2022) (0.2022)
[1.09] [1.08] [1.09] [1.07]
LOSS 0.0054 0.0051 0.0062 0.0066
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197)
[0.27] [0.26] [0.31] [0.33]
UE 0.0085 0.0086 0.0086 0.0087
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138)
[0.62] [0.62] [0.63] [0.63]
LOSS*UE -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0027 -0.0035
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0183)
[-0.19] [-0.18] [-0.15] [-0.19]














Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table VI.8
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
WITH DUMMY VARIABLES D l, D1LEAD1, D1LEAD2, AND D1LEAD3 ARE 
SET EQUAL TO ONE AT THE MONTH OF FILING, AND ONE, TWO, AND




DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
FORECAST HORIZON IS FIVE YEAR LONGTERM  EARNINGS GROW TH
Dl 0.0256 0.0204 0.0153 0.0141
(0.0276) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0282)
[0.92] [0.73] [0.5440] [0.50]
ITC-Prelim 0.0062 -0.0060 0.0035 0.0038
NEGATIVE (0.1109) (0.1110) (0.1109) (0.1108)
[0.05] [-0.05] [0.03] [0.03]
ITC-Prelim 0.0217 0.0203 0.0169 0.0162
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287)
[0.75] [0.71] [0.59] [0.56]
DoC-Prelim 0.0278 0.0271 0.0245 0.0238
(0.028) (0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0284)
[0.97] [0.95] [0.86] [0.83]
DoC-FINAL -0.0288 -0.0296 -0.0320 -0.0326
(0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0309)
[-0.93] [-0.96] [-1.04] [-1.06]
ITC-FINAL 0.0198 0.0180 0.0151 0.0150
NEGATIVE (0.0987) (0.0987) (0.0986) (0.0986)
[0.20] [0.18] [0.15] [0.15]
ITC-FINAL 0.0330 0.0322 0.0307 0.0321
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332)
[0.99] [0.97] [0.92] [0.97]
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI.9
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 
WITH PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
EARNINGS FORECAST HORIZONS
FIVE YEAR (LONG
INDEPENDENT ONE YEAR TWO YEAR TERM) EARNINGS
VARIABLES AHEAD EARNINGS AHEAD EARNINGS GROWTH
A FR EV J 0.7835 *** 0.4137 *** 0.5877 **
(0.1179) (0.1025) (0.2357)
[6.64] [4.03] [2.49]
AFREV_2 -0.3631 ** -0.3493 *** -0.5522 ***
(0.1483) (0.1059) (0.2141)
[-2.44] [-3.29] [-2.57]
A F R E V J 0.3917 ** 0.1818 ** 0.0044
(0.1586) (0.0922) (0.2114)
[2.46] [1.97] [0.02]
A F R E V J -0.0802 -0.0103 -0.2063
(0.1536) (0.0996) (0.2085)
[-0.52] [-0.10] [-0.98]
A F R E V J -0.0627 -0.0458 -0.1796
(0.1451) (0.1060) (0.2004)
[-0.43] [-0.43] [-0.89]




-0.2566 * -0.0362 0.2789
(0.1401) (0.1075) (0.1969)
[-1.83] [-0.33] [1.41]
A F R E V J
-0.0436 -0.0027 0.7171 ***
(0.1443) (0.1081) (0.2023)
[-0.30] [-0.02] [3.54]
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Table VI.9
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 










FIVE YEAR (LONG 
TERM) EARNINGS 
GROWTH
A F R E V J 0 -0.0570 0.0636 -0.7998 ***
(0.1450) (0.1075) (0.2084)
-0.3935 [0.59] [-3.83]
A F R E V J 1 -0.2017 -0.0704 -0.1331
(0.1396) (0.1043) (0.2099)
[-1.44] [-0.67] [-0.63]
A F R E V J 2 -0.0389 0.0139 -0.2205
(0.1119) (0.0991) (0.2322)
[-0.34] [0.14] [-0.94]
LOSS -0.0113 *** -0.0165 *** 0.0214
(0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0241)
[-3.96] [-7.36] [0.89]
UE 0.0053 -0.0037 0.0209
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0235)
[1.46] [-1.05] [0.89]
LOSS*UE -0.0050 -0.0214*** -0.0219
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0302)
[-1.10] [-4.75] [-0.72]
Dl 0.0036 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0354)
[1.45] [0.54] [0.0325]
ITC-Prelim -0.0182 * 0.0165 0.0179
NEGATIVE (0.0097) (0.0111) (0.3343)
[-1.88] [1.47] [0.05]
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TABLE VI.9
ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES 
OF THE TIME AND FIRM EFFECTS 




DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS
EARNIINGS FORECAST HORIZONS
ONE YEAR TWO YEAR
FIVE YEAR (LONG 
TERM) EARNINGS 
GROWTH
ITC-Prelim 0.0027 -0.0003 0.0273
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0290)
[1.07] [-0.17] [0.94]
DoC-Prelim 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0333
(0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0322)
[0.47] [-0.63] [1.03]
DoC-FINAL 0.0017 0.0043 ** -0.0243
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0380)
[0.82] [2.15] [-0.63]
ITC-FINAL 0.0009 0.0070 -0.0016
NEGATIVE (0.0098) (0.0085) (0.0463)
[0.09] [0.82] [-0.03]
ITC-FINAL 0.0034 0.0006 0.0261
AFFIRMATIVE (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0427)
[1.59] [0.32] [0.61]
Observations 2688 2688 2688
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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VI. 3. The Results of the Absolute Forecast Error Model in Relation to 
the Learning of the Filing of Antidumping Petitions 
VI.3.1. Specification Tests
We conduct several specification tests as discussed in Chapter IV.3 through IV.8. 
Table VI. 10 displays the results of these tests for the absolute forecast errors model of 
the regression equation (3.4). We find that fixed effects exist in our absolute forecast 
errors model. An F test for no fixed effects is rejected at the 1% level with 
F6o,27i=2.00. We also check whether we have one way or two way fixed effects. We 
find that an F test for firm effects is significant at the 1% level with F55T27i=2.03, 
which exceeds the critical value of 1.62 at the 1% level. An F test for time effects is 
not statistically significant, at the 5% level with F5i27i=1.72, which is lower than the 
critical value of 2.26. One way fixed effects suggests that our specification is 
dependent only on the cross section to which an observation belongs. The 
autocorrelation test shows that we have a positive autocorrelation in the error 
structure, which is significant at the 1% level with the T-Statistic=3.98. The test for 
the panel heteroscedasticity in the error variances yields a %2 of 481.66 with 55 
degrees o f freedom, which greatly exceeds the critical value of 73.31 at the 5% level. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that the error variance is homoscedastic is rejected. The 
Hausman test o f whether fixed effects or random effects are appropriate is distributed 
as a ^ 2with 4 degrees o f freedom, which at 57.24 greatly exceeds the 1% critical 
value of 18.475. Therefore, in the estimation regression equation (3.4) o f the absolute 
analysts’ forecast errors model, the hypothesis that the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model is rejected.
I l l
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Given this result and the F test indicating the presence o f one way individual 
effects, we conclude that fixed effects are preferable to random effects as a 
specification.
We do not address the issue of cross sectional correlation in our analysts’ forecast 
errors regression model of both equation (3.4) and (3.5), since this may not be 
appropriate. This is because each firm does not necessarily have the same fiscal 
period. For example, for the year t  observation, firm / may announce its annual 
earnings in February in year t, because firm / has a January to December fiscal period; 
firm j  may announce its annual earnings in July in year t, because firm j  has a July to 
June fiscal period. By the same token, firm k may announce its annual earnings in 
October in year t, because firm k has an October to September fiscal period, and so 
on. As such, we neglect the assumption of the cross sectional correlation in the error 
structure for the regression equation (3.4) and (3.5).
Based on the results of the specification tests above, we estimate regression 
equation (3.4) using Feasible GLS with one-way fixed effects and with the 
assumptions o f common first order autocorrelation and panel heteroscedasticity.
VI.3.2. Estimation Results
Table VI. 11 presents the results o f the estimation equation (3.4), which examines 
the effect o f the filing o f an AD petition on absolute value o f analysts’ forecast errors. 
We define the analysts’ forecast errors in absolute values to assess the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts, subsequent to a firm filing an AD petition. We find that the 
coefficient on the dummy variable for filing is positive and not significantly different
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from zero at conventional levels. This suggests that there is no evidence that analysts 
become more or less accurate in their forecasts in first year subsequent to a firm filing 
an AD petition, than in other periods. The coefficient on lagged absolute forecast 
errors is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that analysts learn from 
their own past errors. This is in contrast to Chaney et al (1999) using OLS, who find 
that analysts fail to learn from their own past errors. The coefficient on the variable 
for analysts following (LNA) is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
an inverse relationship between absolute forecast errors and the number o f analysts 
following a firm. This is consistent with Chaney et al (1999) and Alford and Berger 
(1998), that greater accuracy is associated with higher analysts’ following. The 
coefficient on market return RM is negative and not significantly different from zero.
Overall, our results provide evidence that the filing of an AD petition does not 
enable analysts to forecast more or less accurately. Another finding is that the number 
of analysts’ following is inversely related to the absolute forecast errors. In addition, 
the higher o f analysts’ following is associated with greater accuracy. However, we 
have the new result that analysts learn from their prior forecasts.
VI.3.3. Alternate Specifications
The extant literature shows that firm size may be positively correlated with 
forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Next, we repeat the estimation 
regression equation (3.4) with the addition of a variable for firm size measured as 
market capitalization {mcap variable). The second column of Table VI. 12 presents the 
estimation results. The first column of Table VI. 12 is the regression results o f the
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basic regression equation (3.4) from Table V I.ll. From the second column of Table 
VI. 12, we find that the coefficient on the variable for market capitalization is negative 
and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that firm size is positively associated with 
forecast accuracy. This is consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Abarbanell 
et al (1995). Although it is in contrast to Chaney et al (1999), who find an 
insignificant result using OLS with the market value of equity as a measure of firm 
size. The coefficient of the filing  variable remains positive and statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficients on the other variables are 
consistent with those presented in the first column of Table VI. 12.
To consider the possibility that the firm strategy of using debt in their capital 
structure may be interpreted differently by analysts, we repeat the estimation 
regression equation (3.4) with an additional variable, fimlev, which stands for 
Financial Leverage. The inclusion of the fimlev variable is to control the impact of 
financial leverage on the accuracy and bias o f analysts’ earnings forecasts. Financial 
leverage is the change in actual earnings per share induced by the introduction of 
fixed-interest bearing debt, such as bonds or preferred stock, in the capital structure 
(Levy and Sarnat, 1986; Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2002). The most challenging scenario 
confronting financial management is that as the use o f leverage increases, with the 
assumption that the firm does not plan to reduce earnings per share, both actual 
earnings per share may decrease and risk, or its variance, may increase. Knowing that 
analysts may use a firm financial statement in predicting earnings, the firm strategy in 
choosing the fixed payment in its capital structure as a lever may affect the accuracy 
and the direction o f the bias of analysts’ forecasts. As such, we include the variable
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finlev  in our regression as an additional control variable. The third column of Table 
VI. 12 presents the estimation results. We find that the coefficient on the variable 
finlev is positive and not significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The 
coefficient o f filing  remains positive and not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.
Finally, we repeat the estimation regression equation (3.4) by including both the 
firm size (mcap) variable and the financial leverage (finlev) variable.23 The fourth 
column of Table VI. 12 presents the estimation results. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged and consistent with the previous findings.
VI.3.4. Conclusion
In summary, the results presented in Table V I.ll appear to be robust to 
alternative specifications controlling for potential firm size and for the level of debt 
structure that the firm is carrying on in its capital structure. We find no evidence that 
analysts become more or less accurate in first period subsequent to the filing o f an 
AD petition than other periods. We also confirm that higher analysts’ following is 
associated with greater analysts’ forecast accuracy. There is, then, a new result that 
analysts learn from past errors.
23 On every re-estimation, we repeat the specification tests. The results are consistent with those 
presented in Table VI. 10
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Table VI.10 
SPECIFICATION TESTS ON 
ABSOLUTE ANALYSTS’ FORECAST ERROR REGRESSION EQUATION
(3-4)
Specification Tests Results Remarks
Fixed Effect Test:
F Test for NO fixed effect 
Firm Effect 
Time Effect
F6 0 ,2 7 1  -  2.00 
F 5 5 ,2 7 1  = 2.03 
F 5 , 2 7 .  = 1.72
See Chapter IV.3 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001 
Pr > F is less than 0.0001 
Pr > F is equal to 0.1297
Autocorrelation Test Coefficient on et-i = 0.2200 
with the Std. Err = 0.0552 
and T-Statistics = 3.98
See Chapter IV.4 
Ho: There is no first order 





* ’-1-55 = 481.66 
Xc =73.31 at 5% level
See Chapter IV.5 




For Random Effect X l = 57.24 
Zc = 13.28 at 1% level
See Chapter IV.8 
Ho: The individual effects 
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Table VI. 11
FEASIBLE GLS ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH FIXED EFFECT
ON
ABSOLUTE FORECAST ERRORS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.4)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST 
















Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI. 12 
ALTERNATE SPECIFICATION RESULTS 
FOR CONTROLLING FIRM SIZE AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
USING FEASIBLE GLS ESTIMATION WITH FIXED EFFECT
ON
ABSOLUTE FORECAST ERRORS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.4)
INDEPENDENT
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST ERRORS 
IN ABSOLUTE VALUES
VARIABLES Coefficien ts Estimate




























































Wald x 1 ^ 2 (60) =535.68 * 2 (61) =549.97 X 2(61)=537.63 ^ 2(62)=553.77
Observations 336 336 336 336
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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VI.4. The Results of the Actual Forecast Errors Model in Relation to 
the Learning of the Filing of Antidumping Petitions 
VI.4.1. Specification Tests
Table VI. 13 presents the results o f the specification test for the actual forecast 
errors regression equation (3.5). We define the forecast errors in actual value to assess 
the bias direction of the analysts’ forecasts subsequent to a firm filing an AD petition. 
We find that the fixed effects are not statistically significant at the conventional levels 
with Fgo,27i= l -03. This suggests that in terms of the bias direction of the forecast, we 
find no evidence of heterogeneity o f the analysts forecast errors across individual 
firms. Further tests on one-way and two-way fixed effects confirm this result. Firm 
effects and time effects are not statistically significant at the conventional levels, with 
F55.27i=1.08 and F5,27i=0.44, respectively. The test o f  the autocorrelation in the error 
structure yields a T-Statistic=-0.26, which is not significantly different from zero at 
the conventional levels. The panel heteroscedasticity test yields a x 2 of 547.31 with 
55 degrees o f freedom, which greatly exceeds the critical value of 73.31 at the 5% 
level. Finally, the Hausman test o f whether fixed effects or random effects are 
appropriate, is distributed as a %2 with 4 degrees o f freedom, which at 28.54 exceeds 
the critical value o f 13.27 at the 1% level.
Based on the above specification test results, we invoke OLS with robust 
standard errors (white heteroscedasticity) for the correction o f the standard errors.
VI.4.2. Estimation Results
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Table VI.14 presents the results of estimating regression equation (3.5) using 
OLS with robust (white heteroscedasticity correction) standard errors. Regression 
equation (3.5) examines the effects of a firm filing an AD petition on analysts’ 
forecast bias. We define the forecast errors in actual values to assess the bias direction 
o f analysts’ forecast subsequent to a firm filing an AD petition. We regress the actual 
forecast errors against the presence of a firm filing an AD petition and other control 
variables to assess whether analysts’ forecasts exhibit more or less upward or 
downward bias subsequent to a firm filing an AD petition.
From Table VI. 14, we find that the coefficient on the filing variable is negative 
and not statistically significant at the conventional levels. This suggests that we do 
not find any evidence o f the existence o f a bias direction o f the analysts’ forecasts, 
subsequent to a firm filing an AD petition than in a period not following an AD 
petition. The coefficient on lagged forecast errors is negative and not significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels. The coefficient on the variable for analysts 
following (LNA) is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that more 
upward bias exists when the following is large. In addition, a negative coefficient 
implies that, on average, analysts overestimate earnings to a greater extent when the 
following is large. The coefficient on the variable RM (market return) is negative and 
not significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
Overall, our results provide no evidence that in first period subsequent to a filing 
o f an AD petition is associated with the forecast bias to some extent than other 
periods. Another finding is that the number of analysts’ following a firm is inversely 
related to the actual forecast errors. Likewise, the higher number of analysts’
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following is associated with greater upward bias (or less downward bias) in their 
forecasts.
VI.4.3. Alternate Specifications
To check the robustness of our results, we next repeat the estimation o f the 
regression equation (3.5) by including an additional variable for firm size (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996, and Abarbanell et al, 1995) measured as market capitalization 
(mcap). The result is reported in the second column of Table VI. 15 (the first column 
is our basic result). The coefficient on variable firm size (mcap) is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that larger firms are associated with less 
upward bias in analysts’ forecast. This is in contrast to Chaney et al (1999) who find 
an insignificant result using OLS with the market value o f the equity as a measure of 
firm size. The coefficient on filing  remains negative and statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels. The coefficients on the other variables are consistent with those 
presented in the first column of Table VI. 14.
To consider the possibility that analysts may interpret differently firms with 
different debt levels in their capital structure, we repeat the estimation of equation 
(3.5) with an additional variable, finlev, denoting financial leverage. The third column 
of Table VI. 15 displays the result. The coefficient on finlev is positive and significant 
at the 5% level. This suggests that analysts’ forecasts reflect, on average, more 
downward bias (or less upward bias) in their forecasts for a firm with a higher level of 
debt in their capital structure. Accordingly, a positive coefficient implies that, on 
average, analysts underestimate earnings to a lesser extent when the level of firm debt
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is higher. With higher leverage, earnings are distributed over fewer shares of equity. 
This biases earnings per share upward when macroeconomic conditions are favorable. 
On the other hand, when macroeconomic conditions are unfavorable, earnings per 
share are low, even negative. Because of the high debt associated with high leverage, 
interest payments associated with that debt are distributed over fewer shares of 
equity. This biases reported earnings per share downward.
Finally, we repeat the estimation regression equation (3.5) by including both firm 
size (mcap variable) and firm financial leverage (finlev variable). The fourth column 
o f Table VI. 15 reports the estimation result. Overall, the results are consistent with 
the previous results. The coefficient on filing is positive and not significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels. In addition, the coefficient of lagged actual forecast 
errors is negative and insignificant at the 5% level. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
variable for analysts’ following (LNA) is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
However, the coefficient on the market return variable (RM) is negative and 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
VI.4.4 Conclusion
In summary, the main results presented in Table VI. 14 appear to be robust to 
alternative specifications controlling for firm size and for the level o f firm debt in the 
firm capital structure. We find no evidence of biased forecasts in first year subsequent 
to the filing of an AD petition than in other periods. We also confirm that higher 
analysts’ following is associated with greater upward bias (or less downward bias) in 
their forecasts.
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Table VI.13 
SPECIFICATION TESTS ON 
ACTUAL ANALYSTS’ FORECAST ERROR REGRESSION EQUATION (3.5)
Specification Tests Results Remarks
Fixed Effect Test:
F Test for NO fixed effect 
Firm Effect 
Time Effect
F 6 0 . 2 7 1  = 1-03 
F 5 5 ,2 7 1  = 1-08 
F 5 ,2 7 1  = 0.44
See Chapter IV.3 
Pr > F is equal to 0.4318 
Pr > F is equal to 0.3304 
Pr > F is equal to 0.8210
Autocorrelation Test Coefficient on et.i = -0.0143 
with the Std. Err = 0.0553 
and T-Statistics = -0.26
See Chapter IV.4 
Ho: There is no first order 
autocorrelation in the error 
structure.




z l MS =547.31 
Zc =73.31 at 5% level
See Chapter IV.5 




For Random Effect *4 = 28.54 
Zc =13.28 at 1% level
See Chapter IV.8 
Ho: The individual effects 
are uncorrelated with the 
other regressors.
Conclusion: Reject Ho
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI. 14
OLS WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERROR ESTIMATION RESULTS
ON
ACTUAL FORECAST ERRORS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.5)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST 




















Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Table VI. 15 
ALTERNATE SPECIFICATION RESULTS 
FOR CONTROLLING FIRM SIZE AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
USING OLS WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERROR ESTIMATION
ON
ACTUAL FORECAST ERRORS REGRESSION EQUATION (3.5)
INDEPENDENT
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS ANALYSTS’ FORECAST 


















































MCAPj,, N/A 0.0006 ** 
(0.0002) 
[2.50]
N/A 0.0007 *** 
(0.0002) 
[2.71]






R2 0.0291 0.0331 0.0709 0.0764
F Value F4,332=2.49 F5,331=4.70 F5, 331=4.96 F6,330=4.20
Observations 336 336 336 336
Note: ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
T-statistics are in square brackets.
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Prior studies on antidumping (AD) petition investigations have utilized event 
studies, which estimate the significance of abnormal returns to security holders of the 
pertinent firms at the petition date and at important decision dates in the AD petition 
investigation. In contrast, we examine the effect o f the filing of an AD petition and 
the verdicts of the investigative decision on analysts’ forecast revisions and errors 
(sell side brokerage analysts). While market returns contain a mix of short run and 
long run influences, analysts forecast a specific number, earnings, for a finite future 
interval, one year ahead, two year ahead, or a five year growth estimate. Investigation 
of analysts’ response and evaluation to the invocation and implementation o f public 
policy is interesting for a variety of reasons. First o f all, the behavior o f the financial 
industry itself is the subject of intense scrutiny these days. Further, as analysts are 
expected to be better informed than most investors, changes in their earnings 
estimates around the investigation decision dates are inherently interesting. This is 
particularly the case prior to Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). If analysts change their 
earnings forecasts in the month prior to an antidumping filing, it can be inferred that 
corporate insiders are communicating to the market through the analysts. This may be 
an important vehicle by which petitioning firms communicate forward looking 
information to the market about antidumping without incurring potential liability, if
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the forward looking information (prediction) does not materialize. That is, they avoid 
a potential class-action lawsuit by issuing guidance through analysts.
We investigate whether analysts revise their earnings forecast subsequent to the 
filing of AD petitions and the announcement of the investigative decisions. Next, we 
explore whether analysts become more or less accurate in their forecasts upon 
learning about the filing of AD petitions. Finally, we investigate whether there is a 
systematic bias direction in analysts’ forecasts subsequent to the filing of AD 
petitions.
We provide evidence that analysts expect declining performance from pertinent 
firms in the first year earnings when the ITC preliminary decision turns out to be 
negative, but a possible improvement in the second year earnings upon learning the 
Department o f Commerce final decision. We provide no evidence that the filing of an 
AD petition and the announcement of the verdicts o f the investigation affects 
analysts’ expectations about a firm’s five year long term earnings growth. Therefore, 
our findings suggest that the AD petition investigations affect analysts’ expectations 
about firm performance on a short term basis. We also find that analysts may 
anticipate their second year earnings forecasts at one month and three months before 
the filing date. When we examine analysts’ forecast errors in the year following the 
filing o f AD petitions, we find no evidence that the filing of an AD petition affects 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias. There are some new implications for the 
accounting and finance literature regarding learning by analysts. However, some 
previous results in that literature have been confirmed.
127
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VII.2. Limitation
Our method is not without limitation. For example, there may be other events that 
influence the analysts’ forecast revision besides the AD petition investigations, for 
which we have not controlled. Another limitation is from the econometrics 
standpoint. Although we have included the lag o f the dependent variables to reduce 
the effect o f autocorrelation, it is possible that the moving average of the second order 
exists in the error term, for which we have not accounted. It is also possible that the 
compensation policy of brokerages for sell side analysts may affect the forecasts that 
they make. Another advantage of using 1980s petitions is that they are not part of the 
speculative bubble of the mid to late 1990s.
VII.3. Implication for Future Research
Future study could re-investigate the event study that used the market model 
found in the existing literature from the perspective of financial analysts. Therefore, 
the researchers will know whether the effect of the event to the firms’ value is short- 
run or long-run or both. These would be important contributions to the event study 
literature since there is not much literature in the event study focusing on the financial 
analysts’ forecasts.
VII.4. Conclusion
Overall, this study has shown that analysts (sell brokerage firms) do evaluate 
their earnings forecasts with respect to the invocation and implementation of public 
policy. Analysts play an important role as an intermediary between firms’
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management and investors. From the firm management standpoint, the existence of 
an intermediary will reduce firms’ potential liability. From the investors’ point of 
view, analysts are important because they are more independent than the firms’ 
management. As such, our investigation on the effect o f AD petition investigations to 
the analysts’ earnings forecast revisions, accuracy, and bias contributes a great deal to 
the dumping as well as analysts’ forecast literature.
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APPENDIX:
Appendix A: MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
Appendix B: PROGRAMMINGS
B.l: Program to calculate analysts’ earnings forecast 
revisions from the I/B/E/S CDs
B.2: Program to calculate unexpected earnings 
from the I/B/E/S CDs
Appendix C: INDUSTRIES INVOLVED IN THE STUDY
C.l: Firms involved in petitions as were disclosed in USITC 
material injury (section 731) investigative report 
during 1985 through 1987
C.2: Firms involved in petitions with publicly traded shares 
included and deleted from the sample
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Appendix A: MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
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Appendix A-l
Given the equation y  = Xfl  + u with u ~ N ( 0 ,V ) ,  where V is a positive 
definite variance covariance matrix. Since V is positive definite, there exists a 
non-singular m atrix P such that 
(a. 1.1) P'P = V~X.
Prem ultiplying y  = Xf3 + u by P, yields 
(a. 1.2) Py = PXfi + Pu or y,  = X , f i  + u , .
Obviously,
(a. 1.3) E(u, ) = E(Pu) = P E(u) = 0 
and
Var(u, ) = Var(Pu) = E[{Pu -  E(Pu)} {Pu -  E{Pu)}']
= E[(Pu\P u)  = E[Puu'P]
= PVP
Substituting Ffrom  (a. 1.1), gives 
(a. 1.4) V a r (u , )= P P - ](P 'y 'P '  = 1  .
From  these two results, equation (a. 1.3) and (a. 1.4), it is clear that the 
transform ed variables in equation (a. 1.2) meet the requirem ent under which 
O rdinary  Least Squares (OLS) is BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimates).
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Appendix A-2
^gls = Pois = {x ,X,' jx ,y ,
(a.2.1) = { X ' P ' P X ) ] X'P'Py
= (X 'V - 'X Y  X'V~'y.
Accordingly, Var(bGLS ) = (x'V~ix)~' as follows
P o l s  = K l s  > implying that Var{p'0/S)= Var(bGLS) , therefore
Var(b,i u ) = { x ; x . y
(a.2.2) = (X 'P 'PXY
= ( x v ~ ix y .
139




P , e t
_ P n £ n  j





£ P ‘* l r l e.P. S N P N
0
p ;  e ( s , s ; ) p ; '
O PhP{£ n £ hi)Pn .
We know that E[£j£J) = 0 (/' * / ) .
Equations (5.3) and (5.14) imply that E{^ie ] ) = ( y 1cjQ.i and equations (5.18) and 
(5.25) entail P. =cruPj . These two conditions lead to
(a.3.3) p; e (£'£])p;' A ^ pM p X ^ P . )
The condition in equation (5.15) and (5.16) entail (cr*,Q(.) '( ( j^ Q ()=  I r , and
equation (5.17) implies P//* = (cr^C!, ) '.  These two conditions lead to
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P a 2 Q P' = ( p p .-1) = ./ / / \ / / / /
This last condition leads equation (a.3.3) to 
(a.3.4) p; e {s ,c,)p;  = a ? J r .
Therefore, equation (a.3.2) becomes
O
(a.3.5) Vctr(p's) =
< ? ;J r -  a u I  NT
o
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Appendix A-4
Given that s u = p ts t tA + uit, (A R 1), then
A, = u« +  +  Pf«„-2 + p)un-i +   (MA( oo))
<Tcji =  E(£l) = £[(«/, +  P,Ui,t-\ +  p]uux_ 2 + ........ ) 2]
= £[(«,? + P?K'-\ + Pi Ul<-2 +  ) + (2A + ....... )]
Let’s denote:
E (£D  = ^ r  
E { s a£Jt) = CTCj .
E ( U l ! U J I )  =  CTl, i r  
E{ultuJS) =  0 ( t * s ) .
= E ( £ „ £ j<) = E[(u„  + A wm-i + A 2",,,-2 + ..................+ P j u j ,,-\ + p ) u j j - i  +
=  +  P i P j U i , t - \ U j J - \  +  p ] p ) U i , l - 2 U j , - l  + .................)  +  ( 0  +  0  + ................. ) ]
l - p t p j  ’
The Covariance F m atrix is
>n Vn ■- r w
v  = Vn
..
.
Nl ■ v w
/*. V»2 ••• vm
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where V
E ( £ i , £ j . , - , )
e (£,.,-s£j,)
T h e r e f o r e
E ( £ n £ j \ )  E i £ n £ j 2 )  ■" E ( £ n £ / r )
E ( £ i 2 £ j \ )  E ( S i 2 £ j 2 )  E ( £ i 2 £ j r )
_ E ( £ it£ j \ )  E ( s j r£ j 2 ) ••• E { s iT£ j T )
TxT
E ( £ i , £ i , )  =
=  E [ ( “ „  +  P / W / , , - 1  + p N / , , - 2  +  P j U j . I - s - \  +  p ) Uj.,-s-2 +
= E(p-UU-s«j,,-s + P f p j U ^ U j ^  + P r 1Pj^i ,l-s-2Uj,l-s-2 +
• v + 2  „ 2 .
P i  ^ u , i j  
i - p . P j
l ~ P , P j
1
P j p j • p r  1
P i 1 pj •
V i J = ° e . i J p 2 p. 1 •
• p ; . ' 3
p r p r A 7' "  • 1
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Appendix A-5
p  limy? =
p l i m £
oo 1-2
n r y,y,-1 N
/> lim £
/ j —> c o  / = 2
■ ^ , !A
/]->« /=2 '
plim j;
/ j —>co [-2
f  -> \
y u
V *  J
II
p p i  im Z
/?—>oo /=2
f  2 >\ 
JV 00+ /> lim £
n—> °o  t-2
r y  i-ig,"
v « >
=  /> +
p lim X
/ j—>oo t - 2
C o v f a ^ e , )
\  n j
Var(y,)
for a stationary process, Var{y,)= Var(y,_t )
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Appendix A-6
Consider again the model y  = X/3 + u . Now, instead o f assuming the m atrix Z 
has the same dimension as X, let’s assume that Z has more column than X  such 
that rank (Z) > rank (X). Premultiplying both sides o f y  = X(3 + u by Z gives 
(a.5.1) Z y  = Z  Xfi  + Z u .
A  rough way o f obtaining the OLS estim ator o f this transform ed equation is by 
prem ultiplying both sides o f equation (a.5.1) by ( z ' l ) ' '  to get
However, with our generalization assumption, this is not possible. M atrix Z X  is 
invertible, since rank (Z) > rank (A)- A non-square m atrix cannot be inverted. 
To overcome this problem, we premultiply both sides o f the original equation
145
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(a.5.2) p i v = { z ' x Y Z y .
y  = XJ3 + u by X  z ( z  z )  ' z  and obtain
(a.5.3) X  z ( z  z)~ l Z y  = X ’z ( z ' z )~ '  Z X p  + X 'z ( z 'z ) ' '  Z u .
Ignoring the last term and multiplying by [x  z ( z  z ) ' z  yields the
general instrum ental variables estim ator
more
Appendix A-7
p \ \ m b IV = p lim jx z ( z  z )  ' Z X ]"'X  z ( z  z )  'Z  y
H—►<» / / —► co
= p  lim [ x ' z ( z ' z y  Z ' x \  X ' z ( z ' z Y  [z 'Xp + Z'u)
n ~ *  o o
/? + /?lim f r  z - z ] -i f Z 'aO
- 1
f  ^ z ] f z ' z ' - 1 Z u
n -> oo I  « J I « J I  n ) I  n  J I  n J { n )
= P  + f e z r  Z z z  Z z v  ) '  X zv  Z z z  Z z „  =  P  usinS equation (5.53).
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Appendix B: PROGRAMMINGS
B .l: Program to calculate analysts’ earnings forecast 
revisions from the I/B/E/S CDs
B.2: Program to calculate unexpected earnings 
from the I/B/E/S CDs
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A p p e n d ix  B - l
dm log 'clear ' ; 
dm output 'clear'; 
options obs=10000000; 
options nocenter ls=76;
*** THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES ANALYSTS' FORECAST REVISIONS ONE-PERIOD
■k k  k+ AHEAD, TWO and THREE PERIODS AHEAD (AND FIVE PERIODS LONG TERM
*■
*** GROWTH. THIS IS DONE BY SELECTING PERIODN=l, 2, 3, OR 0
•.« *• J- k  k  k  k  k  «t
d a t a  one;
infile 'c:\My DocumentsXMy Research\IBES\us summary\hiout3.us'; 
input ticker 36.
cusip $8. official $ 6 . name $ 1 6 . dilution 5.3 pd $1. 
Canada 31. internat $1. uniform $1. sector 6. start 4.; 
keep cusip ticker; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker;
d a t a  onea;
set one; by ticker; 
if last.ticker then output;
d a t a  twoa;
infile 'c:\My DocumentsXMy Research\IBES\us summaryxhioutl.us'; 
input ticker $6.
period 4. enddate 4. periodn 31. numest 2. up 2. down 2. 




if yr=1900 then yr=2000; 
crspdate=l+12*(yr-1925)- (12-fyr);








if periodn ne '1' then delete;
keep ticker yr fyr crspdate numestl medianl meanl stddevl; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker crspdate;










if periodn ne '2' then delete;
keep ticker yr fyr crspdate numest2 median2 mean2 stddev2; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker crspdate;








if periodn ne '3' then delete;
keep ticker yr fyr crspdate numest3 median3 mean3 stddev3; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker crspdate;







numes 14 =nume s t;
if periodn ne 'O' then delete;
keep ticker yr fyr crspdate numest4 median4 mean4 stddev4; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker crspdate;
d a t a  two;
merge twol two2 two3 two4; 
by ticker crspdate;
d a t a  three;
merge onea(in=a) two(in=b); by ticker; if a and b; 
if (yr ge '1984') and (yr le '1990') then output;


















or (ticker='TKC') or (ticker='DIS') or 
(ticker='A L ') or (ticker='CYL') or 
(ticker='MXM') or (ticker='NII') or 
(ticker='NSW') or (ticker='TYC') or 
(ticker='ACST') or (ticker='AIZ1) or 
(ticker='BF') or (ticker='PSM') or 
(ticker='DRM') or (ticker='PPG') or 




































) or (ticker='ARC') or (ticker='OLN') or 
or (ticker='WMB') or (ticker='ACY1) or 
) or (ticker='GRA') or (ticker='TKR!) or 
or (ticker='FMO') or (ticker='WYMN') or 
) or (ticker='CR') or (ticker='IDL1) or 
or (ticker='DOW') or (ticker='STY') or 
) or (ticker='ZE') or (ticker=1GE') or 
) or (ticker='AMX') or (ticker='IGL') or 
) or (ticker='AS') or (ticker='GW')or 
or (ticker='CAT 1) or (ticker='CKL') or 
) or (ticker='DR') or (ticker='AMB') or 
) or (ticker='LLX') or (ticker='GR') or 
or (ticker=1ICX') or (ticker='W H 1) or 
) or (ticker='TXT') or (ticker='EK') or
or (ticker=1DRCO1) or (ticker='QMSI') or 
) or (ticker='KMG') or (ticker='RAL') or 
or (ticker='F') or (ticker='ARV') or
(ticker='MMM')








or (ticker='BARL1) or (ticker='BRL') or (ticker='ZENI') or 
(ticker='ZEN')
or (ticker='ZENLV') or (ticker='ZENL') or (ticker='LLY1) or 
(ticker='ETN')
or (ticker='T') or (ticker='CMDL') or (ticker='EGLA') or 
(ticker='IBM')
or (ticker='GTE') or (ticker='GILBA') then output; 
keep cusip ticker yr fyr crspdate meanl numestl mean2 numest2 
mean3 numest3 mean4 numest4;







keep cusip ticker yr fyr crspdate mllag nallag m21ag na21ag 
m31ag na31ag m41ag na41ag;
d a t a  five lead;
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keep cusip ticker yr fyr crspdate mllead nallead m21ead na21ead 
m31ead na31ead m41ead na41ead;
d a t a  five;
merge four(in=a) five_lag five_lead; 
by ticker crspdate; if a;
d a t a mti ; set five if (ticker='MTI') then output;
d a t a dis ; set five if (ticker='DIS') then output;
d a t a nwl ; set five if (ticker=1NWL1) then output;
d a t a arc; set five if (ticker='ARC' ) then output;
d a t a al; set five; if (ticker='AL') then output;
d a t a cyl; set five if (ticker='CYLl) then output;
d a t a eye; set five if (ticker='CYC ) then output;
d a t a klu; set five if (ticker='KLU') then output;
d a t a mxm; set five if (ticker='MXM' ) then output;
d a t a nii; set five if (ticker='NII') then output;
d a t a cos; set five if (ticker=1 COS') then output;
d a t a tyl; set five if (ticker=1TYL') then output;
d a t a nsw; set five if (ticker=1 NSW') then output;
d a t a tyc; set five if (ticker='TYC') then output;
d a t a wthg ; set five; if (ticker='WTHG') then output
d a t a wor; set five if (ticker='WOR' ) then output;
d a t a acst ; set five; if (ticker='ACST') then output
d a t a aiz; set five if (ticker='AIZ') then output;
d a t a ghw; set five if (ticker='GHW') then output;
d a t a bfd; set five if (ticker='BFD') then output;
d a t a bf; set five; if (ticker='BF') then output;
d a t a psm; set five if (ticker='PSM' ) then output;
d a t a drm; set five if (ticker='DRM') then output;
d a t a mxs ; set five if (ticker=1MXS') then output;
d a t a dia; set five if (ticker='DIA' ) then output;
d a t a p p g ; set five if (ticker='PPG') then output;
d a t a rok; set five if (ticker='ROK' ) then output;
d a t a seeq ; set five; if (ticker='SEEQ') then output
d a t a hsi; set five if (ticker='HSI') then output;
d a t a as; set five; if (ticker='AS') then output;
d a t a trn; set five if (ticker='TRN') then output;
d a t a dmc; set five if (ticker==' DMC') then output;
d a t a cue; set five if (ticker='CUE') then output;
d a t a oln; set five if (ticker='OLN') then output;
d a t a gt; set f ive; if (ticker='GT') then output;
d a t a gm; set five; if (ticker='GM1) then output;
d a t a wmb; set five if (ticker='WMB') then output;
d a t a acy; set five if (ticker='ACY' ) then output;
d a t a frm; set five if (ticker='FRM' ) then output;
d a t a ire; set five if (ticker='IRC') then output;
d a t a gra; set five if (ticker='GRA' ) then output;
d a t a tkr; set five if (ticker='TKR' ) then output;
d a t a bren ; set five; if (ticker='BREN') then output
d a t a ir; set five; if (ticker='IR') then output;
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d a t a  fmo; set five; if (ticker='FMO1) then output; 
d a t a  wymn; set five; if (ticker='WYMN') then output; 
d a t a  wyg; set five; if (ticker='WYG') then output; 
d a t a  cum; set five; if (ticker='CUM') then output; 
d a t a  cr; set five; if (ticker='CR') then output;
d a t a  idl; set five; if (ticker='IDL') then output;
d a t a  mmr; set five; if (ticker='MMR') then output;
d a t a  sdw; set five; if (ticker='SDW') then output;
d a t a  dow; set five; if (ticker='DOW1) then output;
d a t a  sty; set five; if (ticker=1 STY') then output;
d a t a  pg; set five; if (ticker='PG') then output;
d a t a  oxy; set five; if (ticker='OXY') then output; 
d a t a  ze; set five; if (ticker=1ZE') then output;
d a t a  ge; set five; if (ticker='GE') then output;
d a t a  nph; set five; if (ticker='NPH') then output;
d a t a  wla; set five; if (ticker='WLA') then output;
d a t a  amx; set five; if (ticker='AMX') then output;
d a t a  igl; set five; if (ticker='IGL') then output;
d a t a  ima; set five; if (ticker=lIMA1) then output;
d a t a  kmg; set five; if (ticker=IKMG') then output;
d a t a  as; set five; if (ticker='AS1) then output;
d a t a  gw; set five; if (ticker='GW1) then output;
d a t a  pci; set five; if (ticker=IPCI') then output; 
d a t a  ah; set five; if (ticker='AH') then output; 
d a t a  cat; set five; if (ticker='CAT') then output;
d a t a  ckl; set five; if (ticker='CKL') then output;
d a t a  aa; set five; if (ticker='AA1) then output;
d a t a  rim; set five; if (ticker='RLM') then output; 
d a t a  dr; set five; if (ticker=' DR1) then output;
d a t a  amb; set five; if (ticker='AMB') then output;
d a t a  utx; set five; if (ticker=1UTX1) then output;
d a t a  llx; set five; if (ticker='LLX') then output;
d a t a  gr; set five; if (ticker='GR') then output;
d a t a  dd; set five; if (ticker='DD') then output;
d a t a  icx; set five; if (ticker='ICX1) then output; 
d a t a  wh; set five; if (ticker='WH') then output;
d a t a  aid; set five; if (ticker='ALD') then output;
d a t a  txt; set five; if (ticker='TXT1) then output;
d a t a  ek; set five; if (ticker='EK') then output;
d a t a  mmm; set five; if (ticker=’MMM') then output; 
d a t a  xidx; set five; if (ticker='XIDX') then output;
d a t a  kern; set five; if (ticker='KERN') then output;
d a t a  kny; set five; if (ticker='KNY') then output;
d a t a  cri; set five; if (ticker='CRI') then output;
d a t a  ph; set five; if (ticker='PH') then output;
d a t a  drco; set five; if (ticker='DRCO') then output;
d a t a  qmsi; set five; if (ticker='QMSI') then output;
d a t a  aqm; set five; if (ticker='AQM') then output;
d a t a  tdy; set five; if (ticker='TDY') then output;
d a t a  kmg; set five; if (ticker='KMG') then output;
d a t a  ral; set five; if (ticker='RAL1) then output;
d a t a  nrt; set five; if (ticker='NRT') then output;
d a t a  gm; set five; if (ticker=1GM') then output; 
d a t a  f; set five; if (ticker='F') then output; 
d a t a  arv; set five; if (ticker='ARV') then output;
d a t a  bcl; set five; if (ticker='BCL') then output;
d a t a  barl; set five; if (ticker=IBARL1) then output;
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d a t a  brl; set five; if (ticker='BRL') then output; 
d a t a  zeni; set five; if (ticker=1ZENI') then output; 
d a t a  zen; set five; if (ticker='ZEN') then output; 
d a t a  zenlv; set five; if (ticker=1ZENLV1) then output; 
d a t a  zeni; set five; if (ticker='ZENL1) then output; 
d a t a  lly; set five; if (ticker='LLY') then output;
d a t a  etn; set five; if (ticker='ETN') then output;
d a t a  t; set five; if (ticker='T') then output; 
d a t a  cmdl; set five; if (ticker='CMDL') then output; 
d a t a  egla; set five; if (ticker='EGLA') then output; 
d a t a  ibm; set five; if (ticker=lIBM1) then output;
d a t a  gte; set five; if (ticker='GTE') then output;
d a t a  gilba; set five; if (ticker='GILBA') then output;
d a t a  six;
set mti dis nwl arc al cyl eye klu mxm nii cos tyl nsw tyc wthg 
wor acst aiz ghw bfd bf psm drm mxs dia ppg rok seeq hsi as 
trn dmc arc cue oln gt gm wmb acy frm ire gra tkr bren ir fmo
tyc acst aiz wthg wor nii wymn wyg cum cr idl mmr sdw dow sty
ek pg oxy ze ge nph wla amx igl ima kmg as gw pci ah cat ckl 
aa rim al oln dmc arc dr amb cue utx llx gr gt dd icx wh aid
txt ek mmm xidx kern kny cri ph drco qmsi aqm tdy kmg ral nrt
gm f arv bcl barl brl zeni zen zenlv zeni lly etn t cmdl egla 









keep cusip ticker crspdate yr fyr afrevl afrev2 afrev3 afrev4 
nalav na2av na3av na4av nallead na21ead na31ead na41ead 
nallag na21ag na31ag na41ag;
r u n ;
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A p p e n d ix  B-2
dm log 1 clear'; 
dm output 'clear'; 
options obs=10000000; 
options nocenter ls=76;
THI3 PR0GRAM CALCULATES QUARTERLY UNEXPECTED EARNINGS ■*** + * 
*** QUARTERLY UNEXPECTED EARNING IS QUARTERLY ACTUAL EARNINGS * 
**’• MINUS RECENT QUARTERLY ANALYSTS' FORECAST *•***•***•*• + ****•***•.
d a t a  one ;
infile 'c:\My Documents\My Research\IEE5\us summary\hiout3.us' 
input ticker 56.
cusip 56. official $6. name 516. dilution 5.3 pd $1. 
Canada 51. internat 61. uniform 51. sector 6. start 4 
keep cusip ticker; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker;
d a t a  one a;
set one; by ticker; 
if last.ticker then output;
d a t a  two;
infile 'c:\My DocumentsVMy Research\IBES\us summaryXhioutl.us' 
input ticker 56.
period 4. enddate 4. periodn 51. numest 2. up 2. down 2. 




if yr=1900 then yr=2000; 
crspdate=l + 12*(yr-1925)- (12-fyr) ;








if periodn ne '6' then delete;
keep ticker yr fyr enddate crspdate numest median mean stddev; 
p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker crspdate;
d a t a  three;
merge onea(in=a) twoa(in=b); by ticker; if a and b; 
d a t a  four;
infile 'c:\My Documents\My Research\IBES\us summary\hiout2.us' 
input ticker $6. period 4. declocn 1.
/* pricing block */
price 7. prday 2. prshares 8.3 
/* FY Actuals Block */
fenddat 4. facteps 6. frepflag $1.
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/* Qtr Actuals Block */
qtrdat 4. qtraceps 6. qrepflag SI.
./* Ancillary Data Block */












p r o c  s o r t ;  by ticker crspdate;









keep ticker crspdate qtrdat price qtraceps;
d a t a  five;
merge three(in=a) foura(in=b); 
by ticker crspdate; 
if a and b;
d a t a  six; 
set five;
keep cusip ticker yr fyr enddate mean qtrdat qtraceps price 
crspdate;
if (yr ge '1983') and (yr le '1991') then output; 




or (ticker='TKC') or (ticker='DIS') or
or (ticker='ARC' 
(ticker='CYC')
or (ticker='AL') or (ticker='CYL') or
or (ticker='KLU' 
(ticker='COS')
or (ticker='MXM') or (ticker='NII') or
or (ticker='TYL' 
(ticker='WTHG')
or (ticker='NSW') or (ticker='TYC') or
or (ticker='WOR' 
(ticker='GHW')
or (ticker='ACST') or (ticker='AIZ') or
or (ticker='BFD' 
(ticker='DIA')
or (ticker='BF') or (ticker='PSM') or
or (ticker='MXS' 
(ticker='ROK')
or (ticker='DRM') or (ticker='PPG') or
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or (ticker='SEEQ’) or (ticker='HSI') or (ticker=’AS') or 
(ticker='TRN')
or (Ticker='DMC') or (ticker='ARC') or (ticker='OLN') or 
(ticker='GT')
or (ticker=1GM') or (ticker='MMBI) or (ticker='ACY') or 
(ticker='FRM')
or (ticker='IRC') or (ticker='GRA') or (ticker='TKR') or 
(ticker='BREN1)
or (ticker='IR') or (ticker='FMO') or (ticker='WYMN') or 
(ticker='WYG')
or (ticker='CUM') or (ticker='CR') or (ticker='IDL') or 
(ticker='MMR')
or(ticker='SDW1) or (ticker='DOW') or (ticker='STY') or 
(ticker='PG')
or (ticker='OXY') or (ticker='ZE') or (ticker='GE') or 
(ticker='NPH')
or (ticker='WLA') or (ticker='AMX') or (ticker='IGL') or 
(ticker='IMA')
or (ticker='KMG') or (ticker='AS') or (ticker='GW)or 
(ticker='PCI')
or (ticker='AH 1} or (ticker='CAT1) or (ticker='CKL') or 
(ticker='AA')
or (ticker=*RLM') or (ticker='DR') or (ticker='AMB') or 
(ticker='CUE')
or <ticker='UTX') or (ticker='LLX') or (ticker='GR') or 
(ticker='GT1)
or (ticker='DD1) or (ticker='ICX') or (ticker='WH') or 
(ticker='WH1)
or (ticker='ALD') or (ticker='TXT') or (ticker='EK') or 
(ticker='MMM')
or (ticker='XIDX') or (ticker=1 KERN') or (ticker='KNY') or 
(ticker='CRI')
or (ticker='PH 1) or (ticker='DRCO') or (ticker='QMSI') or 
(ticker='AQM')
or (ticker='TDY') or (ticker='KMG') or (ticker='RAL') or 
(ticker='NRT')
or (ticker='GM') or (ticker='F') or (ticker='ARV') or 
(ticker='BCL')
or (ticker='BARL') or (ticker='BRL') or (ticker=1ZENI') or 
(ticker='ZEN')
or (ticker='ZENLV') or (ticker='ZENL') or (ticker='LLY') or 
(ticker='ETN')
or (ticker='T') or (ticker='CMDL') or (ticker='EGLA') or 
(ticker='IBM')
or (ticker='GTE') or (ticker='GILBA') then output;
keep cusip ticker yr fyr enddate mean qtrdat qtraceps price
crspdate; 
d a t a  mti; set five; if (ticker= •MTI1) then output;
d a t a dis ; set five; if (ticker= 'DIS') then output;
d a t a nwl; set five; if (ticker= 'NWL') then output;
d a t a arc; set five; if (ticker= 'ARC') then output;
d a t a al; set five; if (ticker=VAL') then output;
d a t a cyl; set five; if (ticker= 'CYL') then output;
d a t a eye; set five; if (ticker= 'CYC') then output;
d a t a klu; set five; if (ticker= 'KLU') then output;
d a t a mxm; set five; if (ticker= 'MXM') then output;
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d a t a nii set five; if (ticker=1NII1) then output;
d a t a cos set five; if (ticker='COS ) then output;
d a t a tyl; set five; if (ticker='TYL ) then output;
d a t a nsw; set five; if (ticker='NSW ) then output;
d a t a tyc; set five; if (ticker='TYC ) then output;
d a t a wthg ; set five; if (ticker='WTl G ') then output;
d a t a wor set five; if (ticker='WOR' ) then output;
d a t a acst ; set five; if (ticker='ACST') then output;
d a t a aiz; set five; if (ticker='AIZ') then output;
d a t a ghw; set five; if (ticker='GHW' ) then output;
d a t a bfd; set five; if (ticker=1BFD ) then output;
d a t a bf; set five; if (ticker='BF') then output;
d a t a psm; set five; if (ticker=lPSM' ) then output;
d a t a drm; set five; if (ticker='DRM ) then output;
d a t a mxs set five; if (ticker='MXS ) then output;
d a t a dia; set five; if (ticker='DIA ) then output;
d a t a p p g ; set five; if (ticker='PPG ) then output;
d a t a rok; set five; if (ticker='ROK') then output;
d a t a seeq ; set five; if (ticker='SEEQ ') then output;
d a t a hsi set five; if (ticker='HSI') then output;
d a t a as; set five; if (ticker='AS') then output;
d a t a trn; set five; if (ticker='TRN') then output;
d a t a dmc; set five; if (ticker='DMC') then output;
d a t a cue; set five; if (ticker='CUE') then output;
d a t a oln; set five; if (ticker='OLN') then output;
d a t a gt; set five; if (ticker='GT') then output;
d a t a gm; set five; if (ticker='GM') then output;
d a t a wmb; set five; if (ticker='WMB') then output;
d a t a acy; set five; if (ticker='ACY') then output;
d a t a f rm; set five; if (ticker='FRM' ) then output;
d a t a ire; set five; if (ticker='IRC') then output;
d a t a gra; set five; if (ticker='GRA' ) then output;
d a t a tkr; set five; if (ticker='TKR' ) then output;
d a t a bren ; set five; if (ticker='BREN') then output;
d a t a ir; set five; if (ticker='IR') then output;
d a t a fmo; set five; if (ticker='FMO') then output;
d a t a wymn ; set five; if (ticker='WYMN ') then output;
d a t a wyg; set five; if (ticker='WYG') then output;
d a t a cum; set five; if (ticker='CUM') then output;
d a t a cr; set five; if (ticker='CR') then output;
d a t a idl; set five; if (ticker='IDL') then output;
d a t a mmr ; set five; if (ticker='MMR') then output;
d a t a sdw; set five; if (ticker='SDW') then output;
d a t a dow; set five; if (ticker='DOW' ) then output;
d a t a sty; set five; if (ticker='STY') then output;
d a t a pg; set five; if (ticker='PG') then output;
d a t a oxy; set five; if (ticker='OXY') then output;
d a t a ze; set five; if (ticker='ZE') then output;
d a t a ge; set five; if (ticker='GE') then output;
d a t a nph; set five; if (ticker='NPH') then output;
d a t a wla; set five; if {ticker='WLA') then output;
d a t a amx; set five; if (ticker='AMX') then output;
d a t a igl; set five; if (ticker='IGL') then output;
d a t a ima; set five; if (ticker='IMA') then output;
d a t a kmg; set five; if (ticker='KMG') then output;
d a t a as; set five; if (ticker=IAS') then output;
d a t a gw; set five; if (ticker='GW') then output;
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d a t a  pci; set five; if (ticker=1 PCI1) then output; 
d a t a  ah; set five; if (ticker='AH') then output; 
d a t a  cat; set five; if (ticker='CAT') then output; 
d a t a  ckl; set five; if (ticker=1CKL') then output; 
d a t a  aa; set five; if (ticker='AA') then output; 
d a t a  rim; set five; if (ticker='RLM') then output; 
d a t a  dr; set five; if (ticker='DR') then output; 
d a t a  amb; set five; if (ticker='AMB') then output;
d a t a  utx; set five; if (ticker='UTX') then output;
d a t a  llx; set five; if (ticker=1LLX1) then output;
d a t a  gr; set five; if (ticker='GR') then output; 
d a t a  dd; set five; if (ticker='DD') then output; 
d a t a  icx; set five; if (ticker=IICX') then output; 
d a t a  wh; set five; if (ticker='WH') then output; 
d a t a  aid; set five; if (ticker='ALD') then output;
d a t a  txt; set five; if (ticker='TXT') then output;
d a t a  ek; set five; if (ticker='EK1) then output; 
d a t a  mmm; set five; if (ticker='MMM') then output;
d a t a  xidx; set five; if (ticker=1XIDX1) then output;
d a t a  kern; set five; if (ticker='KERN') then output;
d a t a  kny; set five; if (ticker=lKNY1) then output;
d a t a  cri; set five; if (ticker=ICRI') then output;
d a t a  ph; set five; if (ticker='PH') then output; 
d a t a  drco; set five; if (ticker='DRCO') then output;
d a t a  qmsi; set five; if (ticker='QMSI') then output;
d a t a  aqm; set five; if (ticker='AQM') then output;
d a t a  tdy; set five; if (ticker=1TDY') then output;
d a t a  kmg; set five; if (ticker='KMG') then output;
d a t a  ral; set five; if (ticker='RALI) then output;
d a t a  nrt; set five; if (ticker='NRT') then output;
d a t a  gm; set five; if (ticker='GM') then output; 
d a t a  f; set five; if (ticker='F') then output; 
d a t a  arv; set five; if (ticker='ARV1) then output;
d a t a  bcl; set five; if (ticker='BCL1) then output;
d a t a  barl; set five; if (ticker=1BARL1) then output;
d a t a  brl; set five; if (ticker='BRL') then output; 
d a t a  zeni; set five; if (ticker='ZENI') then output;
d a t a  zen; set five; if (ticker='ZEN') then output; 
d a t a  zenlv; set five; if (ticker='ZENLV') then output; 
d a t a  zeni; set five; if (ticker='ZENL') then output;
d a t a  lly; set five; if (ticker='LLY') then output;
d a t a  etn; set five; if (ticker='ETN') then output;
d a t a  t; set five; if (ticker='T') then output; 
d a t a  cmdl; set five; if (ticker=1CMDL') then output;
d a t a  egla; set five; if (ticker='EGLA') then output;
d a t a  ibm; set five; if (ticker=IIBM1) then output;
d a t a  gte; set five; if (ticker='GTE') then output;
d a t a  gilba; set five; if (ticker='GILBA1) then output;
d a t a  eight;
set mti dis nwl arc al cyl eye klu mxm nii cos tyl nsw tyc wthg 
wor acst aiz ghw bfd bf psm drm mxs dia ppg rok seeq hsi as 
trn dmc arc cue oln gt gm wmb acy frm ire gra tkr bren ir fmo
tyc acst aiz wthg wor nii wymn wyg cum cr idl mmr sdw dow sty
ek pg oxy ze ge nph wla amx igl ima kmg as gw pci ah cat ckl 
aa rim al oln dmc arc dr amb cue utx llx gr gt dd icx wh aid
txt ek mmm xidx kern kny cri ph drco qmsi aqm tdy kmg ral nrt
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gm f arv bcl barl brl zeni zen zenlv zeni lly etn t cmdl egla 
ibm gte gilba;
r u n ;
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Appendix C: INDUSTRIES INVOLVED IN THE STUDY
Table C .l: Firms involved in petitions as were disclosed in USITC 
material injury (section 731) investigative report 
during 1985 through 1987
Table C.2: Firms involved in petitions with publicly traded shares 
included and deleted from the sample
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Table C .l. Firms involved in petitions as were disclosed in USITC material 
injury (Section 731) investigative report during 1985 through 1987
Case No:
Events: Dates
Outcome Industry Against Firms
TA-731-238
File: 1/11/1985 

















































PRC Elder & Jenks 




















































































Bingham & Taylor 
Campbell Foundry 
Charlotte pipe & 
Foundry 
Deeter Foundry 
East Jordan Iron- 
W orld
E L Le baron- 
Foundry
M unicipal Castings 
Neenah Foundry
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PRC Atlantic Steel 
Atlas Steel & Wire 
Continental Steel 
Davis W alker 
Dickson W eather- 
ProofN ail 














































Outcome Industry Against Firms
TA-731-278-280
File: 7/31/1985 Cast iron Brazil Stanley G. Flag
Sufficiency:8/27/1985 pipe Korea ITT Grinnel





File: 9/4/1985 PRC Lenox Candles






File: 9/16/1985 Anhyd­ UK
Sufficiency: 10/16/1985 rous P Q Corp
USITC(P): 10/31/1985 Threat sodium Pennwalt
DoC(P):3/3/1986 W ithdra­ metasili­ Diamond
DoC(F): - wal cate Shamrock
USITC(F): - 7/20/86 Stauffer Chemicals
TA-731-288
File: 9/30/1985 EPROMS Japan
Sufficiency: 10/28/1985
USITC(P): 11/14/1985 Advanced Micro
DoC(P):3/17/1986 Devices
DoC(F): - Suspende Intel Mostek





TA-731- Texas Intrum ents
File: 10/24/1985 Welded Italy
Sufficiency: 12/20/1985 Negative steel Mexico
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Table C.l. Continued
Case No: Outcome Industry Against Firms
Events: Dates
TA-731-300
File: 12/6/1985 DRAMS Japan Advanced Micro-
Sufficiency: 12/17/1985 256 and Devices
USITC(P): 1/27/1986 Injury/ above AT&T
DoC(P):3/19/1986 Threat IBM










File: 2/24/1986 Butt weld Japan Ladish
Sufficiency:3/24/1986 pipe Mills Iron Works






File: 3/10/1986 Brass Italy Diversified-
Sufficiency: sheet and Brazil Industries
USITC(P):4/24/1986 strip South- American Brass
DoC(P):8/l 8/1986 Korea Bridgeport Brass
DoC(F): 11/10/1986 Canada Olin Corp







File: 5/23/1986 Tubeless Brazil Accuride
Sufficiency :6/l 7/1986 steel disc Budd
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Table C.l. Continued
Case No: Outcome Industry Against Firms
Events: Dates
TA-731-338-340
File: 7/16/1986 Urea USSR Agrico Chemical
Sufficiency:8/12/1986 GDR American
USITC(P): 10/9/1986 Roma­ Cyanamid
DoC(P): 1/2/1987 nia C F Industries
DoC(F): 5/26/1987 Farm land




File: 8/25/1986 Tapered H ungar W R Grace
Sufficiency: 9/19/1986 roller y
USITC(P): 10/9/1986 bearings PRC Timken
DoC(P):2/6/1987 Roma­ Torrington Co










L & S Bearing
TA-731-347-348 NTM Bower
File: 8/29/1986 Malleable SKF Industries
Sufficiency :9/25/1986 Cast iron Japan
USITC(P): 10/14/1986 pipe Thailan Stanley Flagg
DoC(P):2/13/1987 fittings d Grinnel
DoC(F): 6/24/1987 U Brand





USITC(P): 11/17/1986 steel pipe Taiwan Bernard Epps
DoC(P):3/17/1987 & tubes Bull Moose Tube
DoC(F): 6/1/1987 Hughes Steel &
USITC(F): 7/14/1987 Negative Tube
Kaiser
M aruichi American 
Pittsburg In t’l 
Southwestern Pipe 
W estern Tube & 
Conduit
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Outcome Industry Against Firms
TA-731-351-353
File: 10/9/1986 Forged FRG Wyman Gordon
Sufficiency: 11/6/1986 steel UK Cummins Engine
USITC(P): 11/24/1986 crank­ Norton Manuf.
DoC(P):5/13/1987 shafts Kellogg
DoC(F): 7/28/1987 Crankshafts




File: 10/30/1986 Portland Colum­
Sufficiency: 11/25/1986 hydraulic bia Ideal Basic-
USITC(P): 12/15/1986 cement French Industries
DoC(P): - Negative Greece Kaiser Cement
DoC(F): - Japan Lehigh Portland-
USITC(F): - Mexico Cement






File: 10/31/1986 Aspirin Turkey
Sufficiency: Dow Chemicals





File: 11/5/1986 Industrial Belgium
Sufficiency: phosphor Israel Occidental-









Outcome Industry Against Firms
TA-731-367-370
File: 11/26/1986 Color Canada General Electric
Sufficiency: 12/22/1986 picture Japan RCA
USITC(P): 1/12/1987 tubes Korea North American-
DoC(P):6/30/1987 Singa­ Philips
DoC(F): 11/18/1987 pore Zenith




File: 12/23/1986 Fabric Taiwan Rubatex






File: 2/10/1987 Potassiu Canada Amax Potash
Sufficiency :3/5/l 987 m In t’l Mineral &
USITC(P):3/27/1987 chloride Chemicals
DoC(P):8/26/1987 Kaiser Chem
DoC(F): - Suspende K err McGee
USITC(F): - d Lundberg
1/19/1988 New Mexico Potash
Texas Gulf
TA-731-376
File: 4/2/1987 Japan Alloy Piping
Sufficiency :4/24/l 987 Stainless American Fittings
USITC(P):5/18/1987 steel butt Bestweld
DoC(P):9/16/1987 weld Custom Alloy

























Japan Allis Chalmers 
AG M aterials- 
Handling 








White Lift Truck 
Yale M aterials














File: 7/20/1987 Brass Japan American Brass

































Outcome Industry Against Firms
TA-731-384 
File: 9/1/1987 
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Table C.2. Firms involved in petitions with publicly traded shares 
included in and deleted from the sample
Date No. of Deleted (v)
Filed Industry firms Firms Ticker (v) Reason
















V See Note 1































6/5/85 Steel wire 
nails
2 Northwestern 







See Note 1 
See Note 3
6/24/85 64 K 
DRAMS




























See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4
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Table C.2. Continued
Date No. of Deleted (v)




3 ITT Grinnel 















































See Note 4 
See Note 4 
See Note 4 




































See Note 1 
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Table C.2. Continued
Date No. Deleted (v)
Filed Industry of
firms
Firms Ticker (v) Reason



















































































See Note 6 
See Note 7
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Table C.2. Continued
Date No. of Deleted (v)





























































V See Note 1






N at’1 Distillary & 
Chemicals 
United Technology 











See Note 1 
See Note 1
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Table C.2. Continued
Date No. of Deleted (v)
Filed Industry firms Firms Ticker (v) Reason
9/1/87 Nitrile
rubber








3 E. I. Dupont 





Note 1: Lack ofl/B /E /S data
Note 2: Merged with “Y” (Steel Fabrication & Component Business o f Allegany 
Corp.) and became CYC.
Note 3: Overlapping investigation between a petition filed on 6/5/85 and a 
petition filed on 10/24/85.
Note 4: Overlapping investigation between petition filed on 6/24/85, 9/30/85, and 
on 12/6/85.
Note 5: A cquired by Southdown (SDW) in M arch 1988.
Note 6: M erged with Eastm an Kodak (EK) in January 1988.
Note 7: Overlapping investigation between a petition filed on 11/5/86 and a 
petition filed on 4/22/87.
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